Azerbaijan

Armenia and Azerbaijan Agreed on a Draft Peace Agreement: What Comes Next?

Geopolitics and Foreign Policy /

On March 13, 2025, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, followed by Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issued statements that the text of the peace agreement between the two countries had been finalized. This development follows more than two years of bilateral negotiations amid an increasingly uncertain and volatile world order. This APRI Armenia Analysis examines the significance of this step and its implications for Armenia’s security and regional stability. What Happened On March 13, 2025, the Azerbaijani and Armenian Ministries of Foreign Affairs issued unilateral statements announcing the finalization of the text of a peace agreement. Armenia expressed readiness to begin consultations on the timing of and venue for its signing. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, stated that an amendment to Armenia’s Constitution was a prerequisite for signing the negotiated agreement and emphasized the necessity of formally abolishing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)’s Minsk Group. Following these announcements, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense has been issuing a dozen statements since March 16 (such as Statement 1, Statement 2, Statement 3, Statement 4, and Statement 5) claiming that Armenian troops had opened fire on Azerbaijani positions along the border in Armenia’s Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces. These statements appear to seek a pretext for justifying a new Azerbaijani attack. The European Union’s mission in Armenia has refuted these claims, stating that it had observed no active incidents along the border as of March 17. The Armenian Ministry of Defense also denied the allegations. Amid growing concerns about a possible escalation, Armenia’s prime minister issued a special statement, asserting that the Armenian Armed Forces had neither a reason nor orders to violate the ceasefire. Armenia’s Peace Efforts: A Sisyphean Struggle By agreeing to finalize the agreement, Armenia made another significant concession to facilitate peace. For months, the draft agreement had stalled due to Azerbaijani demands, framed as two outstanding articles: the mutual withdrawal of legal cases from international courts and the nondeployment of foreign forces along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. On the first point, both countries have filed cases against each other at the International Court of Justice and in the European Court of Human Rights. But Armenia’s ratification of the Rome Statute presents a potential risk for Azerbaijani leaders, who could face trial for crimes against humanity committed in 2022 and 2023. The second outstanding article implicitly targeted the European Union’s Mission in Armenia, an initiative that Baku has repeatedly denigrated—and at times threatened—including in President Aliyev’s January 7 television interview. Despite these objections, the EU mission has significantly strengthened human security at the border. Previously, Armenia had offered to remove European observers from delimited areas of the border while maintaining their presence along nondelimited sections, viewing them as a deterrent against potential escalations by Azerbaijan. The Armenian government had also stated that it was willing to withdraw the lawsuits from international courts—if convinced that a stable and lasting peace had been established—otherwise seeing them as a leverage against Azerbaijan. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, Armenia’s withdrawal of legal cases would formally close the chapter on developments from 2020 to 2023, absolving Azerbaijan of accusations of violating international law during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, 2021 and 2022 incursions into Armenia and the 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh and the forced displacement of Armenians. The removal of the European observers from the Armenia–Azerbaijan border aligns with Azerbaijan’s broader strategy of eliminating mediators, facilitators, and observers between the two countries. This helps Azerbaijan to fully exploit the power imbalance between sides without any external intervention.  Notably, the draft agreement contains no references to Armenian prisoners of war held in Azerbaijani prisons. It also does not address the contentious issue of transportation and communications links, which both agreed to remove from the agreement and discuss separately in 2024—just as they did for the border demarcation and delimitation, signing a separate document to regulate the delimitation commissions. The entire text has been finalized amid a growing information campaign in the Azerbaijani press accusing Armenia of preparing an attack in April 2025. As Baku has been working to justify a new “preventive” military operation, coupled with intensive military drills, Armenia’s acceptance of Azerbaijan’s proposals on the two unresolved articles appears to be an attempt to deprive Baku of any pretext for invasion and to counter the narrative that Armenia is an uncooperative negotiating partner. The move also serves as a direct message to Armenians and the international community that Armenia remains committed to peace—even at the cost of additional painful concessions. Meanwhile, Baku continues to insist on two preconditions before signing the draft peace agreement, as emphasized once again in its latest official statement. The question remains: Has the region made real progress toward peace when Azerbaijan still maintains nonnegotiable conditions for signing the now-finalized agreement? Where Do We Go From Here? As we have said before, Azerbaijan appears to have no genuine intention of making peace with Armenia—or, by extension, helping establish peace in the region. Contrary to the statement of December 2023 and allegedly what was planned between the two parties, the recent announcement was not bilateral. Baku has set two preconditions for signing the peace agreement: Armenia must amend its Constitution and other laws to remove alleged territorial claims against Azerbaijan, and the OSCE Minsk Group must be dissolved. While Armenia is open to considering the latter, the Armenian government and the country’s Constitutional Court maintain that the Constitution contains no territorial claims against Azerbaijan or any other state. Beyond these two preconditions, Azerbaijan has also set additional conditions that it considers separate from the peace agreement: Two other conditions, raised last year but referenced less frequently in recent Azerbaijani statements, include: Azerbaijan appears intent on undermining the positive environment created by Armenia’s concessions. The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry’s recent statements reinforce its aggressive stance toward Armenia and highlight the stabilizing role of the European Union’s mission—a security measure that Yerevan had already agreed to modify, if not remove. Azerbaijan is keeping the window open for further escalation and may launch an attack anytime.

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Armenia vs. Azerbaijan: Defense Budgets, Alliances, and the Illusion of Peace

Regional Security Studies /

The publication was originally published in Mediamax. The enduring conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan casts a long shadow over the South Caucasus, a region crucial for global energy routes and geopolitical stability. The article examines how Armenia, a small nation under persistent threat, is recalibrating its defense strategies amidst escalating regional tensions and Azerbaijan’s aggressive military build-up. It reveals the broader implications of this rivalry for democratic alliances, military modernization, and peace in a fractious area bridging Europe and Asia. Background (Since 2020, this region has been a cauldron of volatility, with Armenia suffering repeated blows from Azerbaijan’s unrelenting aggression). Starting from 2020, countries were involved in several large-scale escalations, which included the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 by Azerbaijan, and the direct Azerbaijani occupation of Armenia’s proper territory in 2021 and 2022. Despite the fact that Baku gained everything it wished before the 2020 war and Yerevan is ready to sign a peace agreement, it continues persistent military pressure to get even more concessions from Armenia. The key issue is the so-called Zangezur Corridor: a route connecting Azerbaijan’s mainland with the Nachichevan exclave via Armenian territory, beyond the control of the Republic of Armenia. Armenia’s increasing defense expenditures reflect a calculated response to enduring threats and regional instability. Yerevan’s focus has shifted toward safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity.  Amidst these challenges, Armenia’s defense strategy seeks to establish a credible deterrent rooted in alliances with democratic nations and investments in modernized military infrastructure.  At the same time, Azerbaijan continues its militarization and modernizes its armed forces,  bolstered by significant weapons procurement from Israel, Turkey, and countries in Eastern Europe. The article adeptly traces the escalation in defense budgets of Armenia and Azerbaijan over the past five years. Military Spending Azerbaijan’s spending trajectory is striking, climbing from USD 2.2 billion in 2020 to a projected USD 5 billion in 2025. This 127% increase highlights Baku’s commitment to maintaining military superiority. Armenia’s defense spending reflects a determined, constrained response to persistent military threats. Its planned 252% budget increase from 2021 to 2025 (USD 1.7 billion) indicates a significant shift in priorities.  Yet, Armenia’s total defense allocation remains a fraction of Azerbaijan’s. Yerevan allocated  USD 745 million in 2020 (including expenses related to the  Second Karabakh War), USD 673 million in 2021, US D820 million in 2022, US D1.3 billion in 2023, and USD 1.4 billion in 2024. Armenia’s defense budget focuses on its armed forces, while Azerbaijan’s includes additional allocations for various institutions. Of Azerbaijan’s USD 5 billion defense budget for 2025, USD 1.57 billion is designated for the armed forces, USD 275 million for national security, USD 318 million for border service, and USD 2.7 billion for “other defense and national security-related activities.” Much of this latter category funds arms procurement, raising Azerbaijan’s core defense budget to approximately $4.3 billion. Notably, some of these expenditures, such as naval costs, are unrelated to the conflict with Armenia. Initially, Azerbaijan planned minimal growth in its 2025 defense budget due to a stagnating economy. However, Armenia’s 20% increase in its defense budget for 2025 prompted Baku to allocate an additional USD 1 billion from its State Oil Fund to maintain its military advantage. For example, Azerbaijan’s planned procurement spending for 2025 surpasses the total value of Armenia’s defense acquisitions, estimated at around USD 2 billion since late 2022. These developments highlight Azerbaijan’s determination to intensify its militarization and sustain its strategic advantage over Armenia, despite Armenia’s constructive efforts to establish peace, as evidenced by its willingness to make concessions and its officials’ repeated public statements to foster reconciliation. Procurement and Alliances Beyond budget figures, it is critical to examine developments in military procurement, alliances, and cooperation within the armed forces of both countries. Since the 2020 war, Azerbaijan has pursued extensive arms procurement from Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, Serbia, and Slovakia. Publicly known acquisitions include 48 155-mm Nora B-52NG self-propelled guns (SPG) from Serbia for USD339 million, 70 155-mm Dita SPGs from Slovakia, Pakistani JF-17 jet fighters for USD1.6 billion, Turkish Akinci heavy combat drones, and Barak MX air defense systems from Israel for USD1.2 billion. Additionally, Azerbaijan has discreetly acquired other military equipment from Israel, modernized its aviation capabilities with Italian C-27J Spartan military transport aircraft, and upgraded its Su-25 attack aircraft in Turkey to enable the use of guided bombs and missiles. Turkey continues to conduct military drills with Azerbaijan, train its forces, and support its stance regarding Armenia. It ties progress in the Yerevan-Ankara normalization process to peace negotiations between Baku and Yerevan. Azerbaijan also held joint drills with Iran, another Armenian neighbor country.   Armenia, seeking to rebuild its military capacity after the 2020 defeat, initially turned to its treaty ally, Russia. However, most weapons procured under August 2021 contracts were never delivered.  Following Azerbaijani incursions into Armenian territory in 2021 and 2022, Yerevan distanced itself from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Russia, shifting its focus to India and France while expanding its security cooperation with the United States and the European Union. Armenia is now undertaking the most significant procurement effort in its history, estimated at USD 2 billion. Recent contracts with India include acquisitions of 155-mm ATAGS towed guns, 72 155-mm MARG self-propelled guns (SPG), Pinaka multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), Akash surface-to-air missiles (SAM), Zen anti-drone systems, Konkurs-M anti-tank missiles, small arms, and ammunition. In 2024, Armenian and Indian defense officials signed a training and institutional collaboration cooperation agreement. Armenia has procured three GM-200 radars, 50 Bastion armored vehicles, 36 155-mm Cesar SPGs, small arms, and other equipment from France. France and the United States also support Armenia’s defense reforms. Meanwhile, Yerevan has invested significant resources in building heavy fortifications along its borders—a strategy unlikely to reflect offensive intentions given Armenia’s limited resources. Conclusion Azerbaijan, following its 2020 victory and the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, continues its militarization efforts to maintain a decisive military advantage over Armenia. Despite significantly higher defense spending, Baku frequently accuses Armenia of

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Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy Strategy in the Post-September 2023 Period

Geopolitics and Foreign Policy /

The article was originally published on Mirror Spectator. From September 2020 to September 2023, Azerbaijan surprised many outside Armenia by taking control of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, first during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and later in a military operation in September 2023. The “liberation of Karabakh” was a cornerstone of Azerbaijan’s domestic and foreign policy throughout the post-Soviet period, and resolving the conflict on Azerbaijan’s terms became a national priority for Baku. After September 2023, Azerbaijan faces a new challenge: to formulate a new national idea to gather the subjects around the ruling elite, as articulated by President Ilham Aliyev during his campaign ahead of the February 2024 snap presidential elections. Two directions of new foreign policy supporting the “new national idea” are emerging. The first pillar is the development of relations with the Turkic world, portrayed as “the gateway to Central Asia.” This includes growing relations with Turkey and the Central Asian Turkic countries. In recent years, Azerbaijan has significantly increased its interactions with Central Asian republics, including high-level visits and enhanced economic cooperation. The Middle Corridor, a route that could connect China to Europe via Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, is one of the economic projects jointly promoted by Azerbaijan and Central Asian republics. Azerbaijan has also emphasized the importance of the Organization of Turkic States. President Aliyev has underscored Azerbaijan’s commitment to strengthening relations with Turkic states as a key foreign policy priority, notably during the meeting with parliamentary officials from Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and Hungary. In the same speech Aliyev emphasized that the Turkic world has great power, with its vast geography and potential — encompassing transportation routes, energy resources, human capital, and a growing population and called for unified efforts to transform this potential into a global influence. These themes were reiterated during the informal summit of the heads of state of the Organization of Turkic States, held in Azerbaijan in July 2024. Azerbaijan is taking steps to connect Central Asia with the South Caucasus, potentially establishing a wider Caucasus–Caspian region and offering a new integration model as an alternative to those proposed by the European Union and Russia. Additionally, Azerbaijan has increased its cooperation with the Global South, establishing a strategic partnership with China and officially applying to join BRICS (the intergovernmental organization comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates). The second pillar of Azerbaijan’s new foreign policy strategy is the development of the concept of “Western Azerbaijan,” which claims significant parts of the Armenian territory as historical Azerbaijani lands. The concept serves two primary goals. First, it maintains Armenia and Armenians as the external enemies of Azerbaijani society, rallying the population around President Aliyev’s rule. For the past 20 years, the promise to “liberate Karabakh” was the primary tool used to consolidate support for Aliyev and to divert attention from systemic problems in Azerbaijan, such as unequal distribution of oil and gas wealth, rampant corruption, the lack of political and individual freedoms, and constant human rights violations committed by the regime. However, after the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, this issue ceased to exist, and the concept of “Western Azerbaijan” may replace it as a new rallying point, requiring consolidation around the ruling dynasty. Domestic political considerations are not the only motivation behind this concept. The second goal is geopolitical: to create a “justification” for future attacks against Armenia. These two visions intersect in the creation of a united Turkic world and the concept of Western Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani leaders frequently claim that the Soviet government severed Armenia’s Syunik region, which they refer to as “Zangezur,” from Azerbaijan and handed it to Armenia in 1920. Thus, a potential attack on Syunik in 2025 could be justified as a step toward uniting the Turkic world and establishing “Western Azerbaijan.” The two directions of Azerbaijan’s new foreign policy strategy do not envisage peace with Armenia. This explains Azerbaijan’s tactics in the peace negotiations with Yerevan to make statements signaling progress while undermining it with insurmountable preconditions. Azerbaijan’s leadership needs Armenia as an adversary for domestic and foreign policy reasons. Both directions can also justify new acts of aggression against Armenia. In current circumstances, while continuing its efforts to sign a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, the Armenian government should send a clear message to its international partners about the growing likelihood of new Azerbaijani attacks against Armenia after the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), and negative implications not only for Armenia but for the entire region, including jeopardizing the region’s potential to become a transport hub. As military balance continues to be in favor of Azerbaijan, despite recent armament purchase deals by Armenia, the Armenian government should realistically assess the capacities and willingness of its different foreign partners to deter new Azerbaijani aggression and make its foreign policy decisions based on those calculations.

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Nagorno-Karabakh Fallout: One Year After

Regional Security Studies /

In September 2023, President Ilham Aliyev unleashed Azerbaijani forces on the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic following a nine-month blockade. The speed and scale of the population exodus marked a dark chapter for the region and gave Armenians a tragic sense of déja vu. September 2024 marks one year after the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, two years since Azerbaijan’s deadliest incursions into Armenia, and four years of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. In this analysis, APRI Armenia reflects on the events of the past year and their implications for Armenia’s security and regional stability. It proposes ways to move beyond the current limbo of “no peace, no war.” Where We Are Today Today, the situation remains unresolved. Many in the international community expected that the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by force would pave the way for faster peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but this expectation has proven misguided. Despite Armenia’s willingness to engage constructively in peace talks, Azerbaijan has, throughout the year, added new preconditions to peace, continually shifting the goalposts for any genuine peace agreement. As of September 2024, Azerbaijan has articulated eight demands, two of which have been presented by Baku as prerequisites for signing any peace agreement: At the time of writing, there has not been any serious military escalation since September 2023. Armenia has created a delicate deterrence balance with the support of its partners. The patrolling activities of the European Mission in Armenia (EUMA) along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border have contributed to this balance, as have repeated statements by Iranian officials (including Abbas Araghchi, Minister of Foreign Affairs) asserting that Iran would not tolerate any changes to borders. Additionally, Armenia has found new partners in India and France to bolster its military capacity and help deter Azerbaijan in the long run. Yerevan’s concession of villages in the Tavush region in March–April 2024, made under the threat of force, may have also contributed to containing active military escalation.  The December 2023 bilateral statement enabled the release of 32 Armenian prisoners of war (while 23 remain captive) and made Baku the default host of the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29). The demarcation and delimitation commissions, directed by Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan and Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev, continued their work in 2024. Most recently, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that the parties have agreed on 13 of the 17 articles constituting the current peace agreement, with a partial agreement on three others. Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev announced that 80 percent of an agreement had been finalized.   Of the 100,632 Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who crossed the Lachin corridor in September 2023, 10,308 have left Armenia as of June. Former representatives of the self-proclaimed government estimate the number to be closer to 20,000. Many who remain in Armenia reportedly face poor social and economic prospects. The forced takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan has created further hardship and uncertainties, compounded by the lack of public statements from the officials of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, now residing in Armenia, and the Armenian government’s silence on the consequences of the forced displacement. With the concession of the Tavush villages that led to 12.6 kilometers being redefined between Armenia and Azerbaijan also came short-lived unrest, indicating some dissatisfaction among the Armenian people and a degree of civic disengagement. A paradox has emerged in the European Union’s and United States’ engagement in conflict resolution. If the EU and the US have initially played an active role as facilitators, this has not yielded the intended results. Aliyev has disengaged from the Brussels format and has undertaken performative diplomacy with the US. No sanctions have been imposed on Azerbaijan for its use of force and the ethnic cleansing it conducted. Neither has Azerbaijan’s occupation of approximately 200 square kilometers of Armenian sovereign territory been condemned. At the same time, the US and the EU continue to engage more closely with Armenia. The diplomatic dialogue is in full force, with the New Partnership Agenda between the EU and Armenia and the new Strategic Partnership Commission between the US and Armenia. The US and EU have also provided humanitarian aid to Armenia to support the refugee crisis. Overall, 2024 has also been an important litmus test for the West and Russia in determining the effectiveness of their diplomatic efforts to promote regional stability.   Is an Agreement Coming? A framework agreement could be signed by November 2024, before or during the 29th session of COP29, given the expectations set by the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides and vocal encouragement by the US and EU to finalize a deal by November. Importantly, if a document is signed, it will likely be a framework agreement, as indicated by statements from Armenia and Azerbaijan. A framework agreement would typically include generic statements of nonaggression and mutual respect for territorial integrity, leaving the core issues—such as restoration of communications and border delimitation—for future negotiations.  Others, including APRI Armenia researchers, doubt a framework agreement will materialize by COP29. Azerbaijan has been adamant that nothing will be signed until Armenia changes its constitution and other laws and supports the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group—a position President Aliyev reiterated during his most recent call with US Secretary of State Blinken. The Armenian government has explained that these constitutional changes are a domestic issue requiring a proper democratic process, which cannot be completed before 2027. In any case, the long-term stabilizing effect of a framework agreement remains to be determined, as such agreements typically fail to address the core issues driving the conflict, merely postponing them and leaving room for further bellicose maneuvers.  The current “no war, no peace” situation is daunting, raising questions about how Azerbaijan will respond to the upcoming Georgian and US elections and whether—or indeed when—it will test red lines by using military means to achieve its political objectives.  As in spring 2024, Azerbaijan may again demand “the return of the Azerbaijani enclaves” of Tigranashen, Sofulu, Barkhudarlu, and Verin Voskepar, claiming that its president’s patience has reached its limit and threatening a new military offensive. Another option, if Armenia’s current deterrence configuration fails, could be the launch of a military offensive through Armenia’s Vayots Dzor or Syunik regions. Baku could use the strategic positions it occupies to launch an attack on

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Is Azerbaijan Interested in Peace?

Geopolitics and Foreign Policy /

The article was originally published on Iipvienna.com The immediate aftermath of the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan After the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of the Armenians who lived there, there were hopes in Armenia and abroad that an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement was within reach. These hopes were based on the assumption that Azerbaijan had achieved its primary objective for the past 30 years: the full absorption of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan without any Armenian claims over the region. Since September 2023, Azerbaijan has controlled all of Nagorno-Karabakh, with only a handful of Armenians remaining there. The Armenian government has accepted this reality and has no intention of challenging it. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has faced no repercussions from the US, the EU, or Russia for imposing a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022, ignoring the orders of the International Court of Justice, launching a military attack in September 2023, or forcing all Armenians to leave the region. It seemed that the time for peace had thus arrived – a peace that would formalize Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh, settle relations with Armenia, and open the way for the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. Normalized relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey would also allow Armenia to take tangible steps to reduce its dependence on Russia. Thus, with the much-anticipated peace agreement, Azerbaijan would have paved the way to a more stable region and a reduced Russian presence in the South Caucasus, while Georgia would embark on its path as an EU candidate country. The EU and the US may have had these hopes in late September 2023. They looked forward to the triumph of Western mediation efforts –  signing an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement by the end of 2023 – and the imminent decline of Russia’s presence in the South Caucasus. The December 7th, 2023 Armenia-Azerbaijan joint statement on the release of prisoners of war and Armenia’s support for the Azerbaijani bid to host COP29 in Baku in 2024 gave more impetus to these hopes. Azerbaijan’s ever-changing demands Five months later, however, the peace agreement has still not been signed, and there are growing doubts that it might be signed anytime soon. The cause for this lies not in Armenia’s demands to secure the right of return for Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, to provide an autonomous status to Nagorno-Karabakh, or to withdraw Azerbaijani troops from the occupied territories of Armenia prior to any agreement. Instead, the primary reasons lie in Azerbaijan. These include Baku’s refusal to continue negotiations in Western platforms; its ever-changing demands for an extraterritorial corridor via Armenia from Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan; its refusal to agree on concrete maps for the border delimitation and demarcation process; its unwillingness to withdraw its troops from the Armenian territories that it occupied in 2021-2022, which de facto means a refusal to recognize Armenian territorial  integrity in accordance with 1991 Alma-Ata declaration (which Azerbaijan accepted in multiple statements during negotiations in Prague and Brussels in 2022-2023); and its demands to amend the Armenian constitution and other legal acts. By putting forward these demands and constantly threatening to “use the iron fist” again if Armenia refuses to accept them, Azerbaijan has effectively killed the possibility of signing any real agreement. Instead, Azerbaijan argues that both sides should sign a “framework agreement” that will only include general terms and omit any outstanding issues. Indeed, according to Baku, the thornier issues should be discussed in future negotiations, while the “framework agreement” would cover general statements on the recognition of territorial integrity, noninterference, and a commitment to not using one another’s territory for any harmful activities. Importantly, this document would not clarify the principles of border delimitation and demarcation – one of the key areas of the negotiations – or which maps the process should be based on. The document would also not include any accepted principles on the restoration of communications – another critical issue – especially on the question of passport and border controls between Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to Azerbaijani logic, the signature of such a “framework agreement” will significantly decrease tensions and pave the way for more constructive negotiations to find solutions for the thornier issues. It also argues that a contrario the absence of any peace agreement will increase the likelihood of military flare-ups and will keep the situation volatile – thus hinting that if Armenia refuse to sign the “framework agreement,” Azerbaijan is justified in using military means, as it has done before to successfully achieve its political aims. Simultaneously, however, Azerbaijan continues to demand a de facto extraterritorial corridor via Armenia to connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. This position was once again emphasized by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during his January 10th, 2024 interview with local media. Aliyev stated that no border, passport, or customs controls should exist for goods that pass via Armenia from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan; otherwise, Azerbaijan will not open any communications with Armenia and “Armenia will continue to be a dead end.” In the same interview, Aliyev said that Azerbaijan will not agree to any guarantors for the future peace agreement. Interestingly, while Azerbaijan argues that there should be no controls to connect one part of Azerbaijan with another, Baku has never demanded a lifting of passport, border, and customs controls via Iran to reach Nakhchivan from Azerbaijan proper. Azerbaijan has used Iranian territory for the last 30 years to connect with Nakhchivan – recently coming to an agreement with Iran to establish new routes – but there was no talk of Iran granting a passport-, border-, and customs-free regime for Azerbaijani persons and cargo traveling via Iranian territory to reach Nakhchivan. Azerbaijan sent its latest version of suggestions for a peace agreement to Armenia in late December 2023, and Yerevan shared its version with Baku on January 4th, 2024. Armenia’s Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Security Council recently mentioned that Armenia saw some regression in the latest Azerbaijani proposal shared with Armenia. There are

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Opinion: Remember Kazan, for history can repeat itself

Media /

APRI Armenia Senior Research Fellow discusses the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiation process in his new article for commonspace.eu: “Opinion: Remember Kazan, for history can repeat itself.” Referring to the failed Kazan Summit of June 2011, Benyamin Poghosyan draws the parallel with how the current negotiation process seems to be a “negotiation for the sake of negotiation process” that may end with another escalation. With reference to the upcoming EU and US elections, and the Russia-Ukraine war, he posits several recommendations on how the international community should act.

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Geopolitics and Foreign Policy

What Next in Armenia – Azerbaijan Negotiations

Geopolitics and Foreign Policy /

The article was published in The Armenian Weekly. n the late months of 2022 and 2023 there were intensive discussions about the possible signature of the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement. Both international mediators and facilitators, as well as representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan were making statements that a peace agreement signature is within reach. As we enter 2024, discussions are underway about the potential signature of the Armenia – Azerbaijan agreement in 2024. The December 7, 2023, bilateral statement on the release of Prisoners of War and Armenia’s support of the Azerbaijani bid to host the COP29 in Baku gave more impetus to these hopes. Some believe that the military takeover of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 made this perspective more realistic, especially as the Armenian government agreed not to include anything on Nagorno Karabakh in the peace agreement. However, as with any agreement, the content is more important than the title, and here, Armenia and Azerbaijan have different approaches. Azerbaijan argues that sides should sign a framework document that will include only general terms and will omit any issues upon which sides cannot reach a consensus. Thus, the peace agreement should not have any clarity about the principles of delimitation and demarcation, one of the key areas of the negotiations, and any agreement on what map should be used as a base for the process. The document should not also include any agreed principles on the restoration of communications, another key issue, especially on the issues of passport and border control. According to Azerbaijan’s point of view, these issues should be discussed in future negotiations, while the agreement itself will include some general statements on the recognition of territorial integrity, noninterference, and not using each other’s territory for any harmful activities against the sides. Azerbaijan argues that the signature of the framework agreement will significantly decrease the tensions, diminish the likelihood of the resumption of hostilities, and will pave the way for more constructive negotiations to find solutions over the thorniest issues. It also argues that a contrario the absence of any peace agreement will increase the likelihood of military flare-ups and will keep the situation volatile, thus hinting that if Armenia rejects the signature of the framework agreement, then Azerbaijan “is justified in using military mean as  it did in May and November 2021 and September 2022 to achieve its political aims. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan continues to demand a de facto extraterritorial corridor via Armenia to connect Azerbaijan with the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic. This position was once more emphasized by President Aliyev during his January 10, 2024, interview with local media. President Aliyev mentioned that no border, passport, or customs control should take place for goods that will pass via Armenia from Azerbaijan to Nakhijevan; otherwise, Azerbaijan will not open any communication with Armenia, and “Armenia will continue to be a dead end.” In the same interview, President Aliyev told that Azerbaijan will not agree to have any guarantors for the future peace agreement. Interestingly, while Azerbaijan argues that there should be no controls to connect one part of Azerbaijan with another, Baku has never claimed to have passport, border, and customs control-free transit via Iran to reach Nakhijevan from Azerbaijan proper. Azerbaijan has used Iranian territory for the last 30 years to connect with Nakhijevan and recently came to agreement with Iran to establish new routes via Iran to reach Nakhijevan, but there was no talk about Iran granting passport, border, and customs-free regime for Azerbaijani persons and cargo traveling via Iranian territory to reach Nakhijevan.  Armenia, on the other hand, categorically rejects the possibility of allowing the passage of goods via its territory without any passport, border, or customs control and insists on the necessity of establishing guarantors, as well as an international dispute-solving mechanism to prevent and manage any future breach of the agreement. Armenia believes that any peace agreement should at least include the principles of the future border delimitation and demarcation process with agreed maps, as well as clarity over the process of restoration of communications. Armenia argues that a peace agreement should not leave any space for misinterpretations, which is likely to trigger future tensions and escalations. Thus, from the Armenian perspective, if all problematic issues are simply taken out from the text of the agreement, the document itself will become an empty shell which will not solve any problems and will not decrease the possibility of new military escalations. Azerbaijan sent its latest version of suggestions on a peace agreement to Armenia in late December 2023, and Armenia shared its version with Baku on January 4, 2024. The Armenian Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Security Council recently mentioned that Armenia saw some regression in the latest Azerbaijani suggestions shared with Armenia. They did not disclose any details, but it is probably related to Azerbaijani’s demands for control-free movement via Armenia from Azerbaijan to Nakhijevan and the rejection of the institute of guarantors.     How should Armenia and Azerbaijan move forward towards the signature of the peace agreement? If they agree on the Azerbaijani vision, then the peace agreement will simply fix the new post-September 2023 status quo, where there is no self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic, no Armenians living there, with Armenia accepting this reality with no vision and no wish to change it, and with at least 200 square km of Armenian territory remaining under Azerbaijani control. Simultaneously, essential disagreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan on all other issues will remain in place; there will be no restoration of communication, no start of border delimitation and demarcation process, and threats will always be there for new Azerbaijani attacks. Thus, the “framework agreement” will only serve Azerbaijani interests to close the Nagorno Karabakh chapter while providing no benefits and real assurance of future security to Armenia. Some may argue that any framework agreement is better than no agreement at all, mentioning that the lack of agreement paves the way for new attacks against Armenia by Azerbaijan. However, as we mentioned, the “framework agreement” will not reduce, but only delay, the threat of new

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Armenia must avoid becoming entangled in the ‘Russia vs West, democracy vs authoritarianism’ dilemma

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In an article for CivilNet APRI Armenia’s Benyamin Poghosyan argues that Armenia must avoid becoming entangled in the broader geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West, particularly in the context of its relations with Russia and the EU. While Armenia has expressed frustration with Russia, especially after the 2020 Karabakh war, and is seeking to engage more with the West, it faces pressure from both sides. The author emphasizes the importance of balancing relations with both Russia and Western countries.

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