Regional Security Studies

Introduction Nearly five years have passed since Armenia’s defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, almost three years since Azerbaijan’s September 2022 attack on Armenia’s territory, and more than 12 months since the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh. This sequence of defeats and crises has laid bare the near-total failure of Armenia’s deterrence mechanisms. Since 2023, the conflict has been in a no peace no war limbo, while Azerbaijan continues to use bellicose rhetoric and exert military pressure on Armenia, regularly opening fire on Armenian border villages and accusing Armenia of doing the same without providing any evidence. At the same time, over the past few years, some elements have shifted in Armenia’s deterrence configuration that must be taken into account. The persisting security risks in Armenia, together with uncertain geopolitical dynamics, have underlined the necessity of continuously strengthening and adapting Armenia’s deterrence strategy. In this paper, we review the ongoing process of rebuilding Armenia’s deterrence mechanisms, in particular the reforms of the Armed Forces and the diversification of its foreign policy. We also make recommendations regarding defense procurement and planning, capacity building and the local defense industry. From Concepts to Implementation Since the last edition of this paper in 2023, Armenia has continued steadily to diversify its security architecture. Defense cooperation with India and France is now up and running. These countries have become the two largest suppliers of military equipment to Armenia and training to the Armenian Armed Forces. Despite this progress, however, the military balance is still not in Armenia’s favor and no external power has provided full military guarantees to Armenia, as was the case with Russia before 2020. In the absence of a fully developed deterrence plan and in the midst of persistent threats of renewed aggression from Azerbaijan, Armenia continues to upgrade its military structure, diplomacy and foreign policy resources. In this volatile and tense environment, putting in place these three pillars of Armenian deterrence should be the main priority. Since 2023, Armenia has published its long-term Armed Forces Transformation Concept through 2035 and finalized the Comprehensive Defense Concept and Territorial Defense Troops Concept, which are important steps in the right direction. Having said that, the pace of ongoing military reforms remains suboptimal. The implementation of the abovementioned strategic frameworks has been fragmented and is heavily dependent on the individual capacities of the civil servants and officers in charge of these portfolios. This underscores the need for further improvement of governance in Armenia and capacity-building in the state apparatus. For example, while artillery forces have made significant strides in operational capability since 2020, the Territorial Defense Forces remain underdeveloped. Despite long- anticipated legislative changes and the formal adoption of the Territorial Defense Troops Concept, they have yet to emerge as a meaningful component of national defense. Recommendations Learning the Lessons of 2020–2023 Following its victory in the 1992–1994 war, Armenia initially maintained military and diplomatic superiority over Azerbaijan, partly due to Russia’s embargo on arms sales, which was informally breached to Armenia’s benefit. This advantage began to decline after 2002 when President Vladimir Putin lifted the embargo, enabling Azerbaijan to capitalize on growing oil and gas revenues and increase arms imports from Russia and Israel starting in 2007. In response, Armenia adopted a defensive military doctrine emphasizing cooperation within Russian-led structures, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s Integrated Air Defense System and the United Group of Forces. Armenia also sought to bolster its missile capabilities, acquiring modern Iskander missiles in 2016 to serve as a strategic deterrent by threatening Azerbaijani critical infrastructure. However, persistent internal challenges—including widespread corruption, nepotism, ineffective procurement practices, low-quality military education, and poor strategic planning—significantly diminished Armenia’s military capabilities, undermining its ability to counter Azerbaijan’s military growth effectively. Yerevan took steps to reverse its strategic decline after the bitter defeat of 2020 and the Azerbaijani attacks of September 2022. It dramatically increased defense spending, actively engaged in defense reform, and pursued new partnerships, particularly with India and France. Armenia also expanded its defense cooperation with the United States and Iran. Armenia’s defense spending reflects a determined, constrained response to persistent threats. A 128% increase in its defense budget between 2020 and 2025—reaching $1.7 billion—marks a significant shift in national priorities. At the same time, Armenia’s defense expenditure remains well behind that of Azerbaijan, whose budget reached nearly $5 billion in 2025. Armenia is conducting the largest military procurement drive in its history, totaling approximately $2.5 billion. Recent agreements with India include the acquisition of 155-mm ATAGS towed artillery, 72 units of 155- mm MArG self-propelled guns, Pinaka multiple-launch rocket systems, Akash surface-to-air missile systems, Zen anti- drone technologies, Konkurs-M anti- tank missiles, small arms, and ammunition. In 2024, Armenia and India signed an agreement on military training and institutional cooperation. Armenia has procured three GM-200 radars from France, 50 Bastion armored vehicles, 36 Caesar 155-mm self-propelled artillery systems, and various small arms and equipment. France and the United States have actively supported Armenia’s ongoing defense reforms. Concurrently, Yerevan has invested heavily in constructing fortified defensive structures along its borders— a strategy indicative of a primarily defensive posture. In addition, the Armenian Armed Forces hold contracts exceeding $420 million with domestic producers, underscoring the growing capacity of the national defense industry. Assessing the Military Reform Agenda The 2020 war and subsequent standoffs with Azerbaijan have tested Armenia’s deterrence capabilities and its ability to wage modern war. Armenia’s defense needs require sustained, in-depth military reform, talent development, and institutional capacity-building. However, ongoing efforts remain fragmented and in some cases are being implemented more slowly than necessary. Forthcoming reforms, as part of executing the Armed Forces Transformation and Comprehensive Defense Concepts, must include the following steps: Foreign Policy Diversification Another key element in developing an effective deterrence strategy is establishing a coherent and diversified foreign policy—one that provides Armenia with reliable partners and broad-based diplomatic support. The importance of optimal foreign policy and diplomacy undervalued, as should not be Armenia faces foreign policy challenges not only from Azerbaijan but also from Turkey. Besides, simultaneously

The Commentary was originally published on RUSI website. Armenia is redefining its security strategy, diversifying its alliances and boosting military capacity as shifting geopolitics expose the limits of Russian-backed guarantees. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, newly independent Armenia became one of Russia’s closest allies, joining the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and aligning its economic integration with Moscow. Armenia’s alignment was based on the understanding that Russia would act as its security guarantor against hostile neighbours. The need for fundamental changes to Yerevan’s deterrence strategy became apparent with the shift in regional geopolitics following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the global changes exacerbated by the Russo-Ukrainian War. Today, Armenia is actively pursuing a deterrence strategy that balances the realities of its geography with an evolving world order. Leaving the Post-Soviet Security Architecture Behind  After gaining independence from the Soviet Union, Armenia’s foreign and security policies closely aligned with Russia. However, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijani incursions into Armenian territory in 2021 and 2022, and the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan – coupled with the inaction of the Russian peacekeeping mission – exposed the risks associated with Armenia’s overdependence on Russia and the CSTO for its security. While Russia may have had its reasons to avoid fulfilling its security guarantees, such as its focus on Ukraine and increasing economic ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey, these events underscored the fact that the Russia-dominated security framework was no longer reliable and that Armenia’s military capabilities were insufficient. Recognising that reliance on a single security partner poses substantial risks – a reality also felt by other European countries – Armenia has begun to intensify its engagement with a broader range of external powers and to strengthen its military capacity. Towards a New Two-Pronged Deterrence Strategy Armenia’s defence expenditure doubled between 2022 and 2024, with $1.7 billion earmarked for 2025. This marked increase follows the severe setbacks faced by the Armenian Army in 2020 and subsequent years, stemming from chronic underfunding and its inability to respond to Azerbaijan’s aggressions adequately. The risk of military escalation remains significant, even after the September 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, the coveted enclave that was once an autonomous oblast inside Soviet Azerbaijan with a heavy majority of Armenians, and despite the ongoing peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Notably, in both 2021 and 2022, Azerbaijan attacked Armenia amid similar negotiations. While Baku has now achieved its long-held ambition of ‘liberating Karabakh’, peace remains elusive, with Azerbaijan’s consistent threats of force and its state-driven agenda of reclaiming ‘Western Azerbaijan’ casting doubt on its willingness to foster peaceful relations. Recognising that reliance on a single security partner poses substantial risks, Armenia has begun to intensify its engagement with a broader range of external powers and to strengthen its military capacity To effectively bolster its armed forces as part of a two-pronged strategy to strengthen its deterrence, Armenia must develop a robust strategy for military enhancement, accelerate training and education, increase procurement and further develop its domestic defence sector. The government is already actively addressing these areas, supported by a diversified array of security partners. In the past two years, Armenia has notably pivoted to new security alliances, opting for a EU civilian monitoring mission along its border with Azerbaijan instead of the CSTO’s alternative. The Armenian Armed Forces have transitioned procurement and training activities towards new partners, made possible by substantial economic growth since 2022. Ironically, this growth has been partly driven by an influx of Russian immigrants and businesses – including prominent Western companies – fleeing Russia, along with a heightened demand for Armenian exports. These factors, coupled with Western sanctions on Moscow, have created additional income streams that have allowed Armenia to fund a security framework that no longer relies solely on Russian guarantees, although economic dependence on Russia has deepened at the same time. Armenia’s bolstered defence budget has enabled Yerevan to secure contracts with India worth more than $1.5 billion in 2022–2023 and with France totalling at least $250 million in 2023–2024 (APRI Armenia estimate, based on open-source data on different contracts). Security partnerships with these countries include deploying French military instructors and a permanent French adviser within the Armenian Ministry of Defence, as well as training initiatives led by India.  Concurrently, Armenia maintains positive relations with Iran, which – along with Georgia – shares one of Armenia’s two open borders (the others, with Turkey and Azerbaijan, remain closed). Relations with Iran are important for Armenia’s security, with Tehran openly supporting Armenia’s territorial integrity. Additionally, some military equipment from India reaches Armenia via Iran.  Importantly, if the war in Ukraine concludes – a possibility that may increase with Donald Trump’s return to office – Russia may refocus its attention on the South Caucasus. Under such delicate circumstances, Yerevan must balance geographical and geopolitical realities to shape a viable deterrence strategy. In light of geopolitical shifts and the reality of its geography, Armenia requires a long-term economic reconfiguration to avoid overreliance on a single partner and underinvestment in its resources Armenia’s new deterrence strategy must be based on realistic diversification, which includes an array of partners including those mentioned above and Russia. While the Russian base in Gyumri remains, its presence provides – rightly or wrongly – a perceived protection against Turkish involvement in a renewed Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. Without stronger guarantees from other security partners, a more radical departure from this emerging, diversified architecture can only occur if regional tensions decrease significantly, such as through a mutually acceptable peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan or normalisation of relations with Turkey. However, given current political trends, this scenario appears unlikely in the short term. Economic Dependencies: A Different Landscape In the economic sphere, Armenia’s dependency on Russia is more pronounced. Russia has long-term concessions in Armenia’s strategic sectors, including railways, nuclear power, natural gas distribution and wheat. For Russia, since 2022, economic relations have become the preferred instrument for maintaining its influence in the region. While Armenia has complied with Western sanctions against Russia and banned exports in categorised products, its Eurasian Economic Union membership has been advantageous. In light of geopolitical shifts and the reality of its geography, Armenia requires a long-term economic reconfiguration to avoid overreliance on a single partner and underinvestment in its