Is Azerbaijan Interested In Peace?

The article was originally published on Iipvienna.com.

The immediate aftermath of the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan

After the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of the Armenians who lived there, there were hopes in Armenia and abroad that an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement was within reach. These hopes were based on the assumption that Azerbaijan had achieved its primary objective for the past 30 years: the full absorption of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan without any Armenian claims over the region.

Since September 2023, Azerbaijan has controlled all of Nagorno-Karabakh, with only a handful of Armenians remaining there. The Armenian government has accepted this reality and has no intention of challenging it. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has faced no repercussions from the US, the EU, or Russia for imposing a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022, ignoring the orders of the International Court of Justice, launching a military attack in September 2023, or forcing all Armenians to leave the region. It seemed that the time for peace had thus arrived – a peace that would formalize Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh, settle relations with Armenia, and open the way for the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. Normalized relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey would also allow Armenia to take tangible steps to reduce its dependence on Russia. Thus, with the much-anticipated peace agreement, Azerbaijan would have paved the way to a more stable region and a reduced Russian presence in the South Caucasus, while Georgia would embark on its path as an EU candidate country.

The EU and the US may have had these hopes in late September 2023. They looked forward to the triumph of Western mediation efforts –  signing an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement by the end of 2023 – and the imminent decline of Russia’s presence in the South Caucasus. The December 7th, 2023 Armenia-Azerbaijan joint statement on the release of prisoners of war and Armenia’s support for the Azerbaijani bid to host COP29 in Baku in 2024 gave more impetus to these hopes.

Azerbaijan’s ever-changing demands

Five months later, however, the peace agreement has still not been signed, and there are growing doubts that it might be signed anytime soon. The cause for this lies not in Armenia’s demands to secure the right of return for Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, to provide an autonomous status to Nagorno-Karabakh, or to withdraw Azerbaijani troops from the occupied territories of Armenia prior to any agreement.

Instead, the primary reasons lie in Azerbaijan. These include Baku’s refusal to continue negotiations in Western platforms; its ever-changing demands for an extraterritorial corridor via Armenia from Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan; its refusal to agree on concrete maps for the border delimitation and demarcation process; its unwillingness to withdraw its troops from the Armenian territories that it occupied in 2021-2022, which de facto means a refusal to recognize Armenian territorial  integrity in accordance with 1991 Alma-Ata declaration (which Azerbaijan accepted in multiple statements during negotiations in Prague and Brussels in 2022-2023); and its demands to amend the Armenian constitution and other legal acts.

By putting forward these demands and constantly threatening to “use the iron fist” again if Armenia refuses to accept them, Azerbaijan has effectively killed the possibility of signing any real agreement. Instead, Azerbaijan argues that both sides should sign a “framework agreement” that will only include general terms and omit any outstanding issues. Indeed, according to Baku, the thornier issues should be discussed in future negotiations, while the “framework agreement” would cover general statements on the recognition of territorial integrity, noninterference, and a commitment to not using one another’s territory for any harmful activities. Importantly, this document would not clarify the principles of border delimitation and demarcation – one of the key areas of the negotiations – or which maps the process should be based on. The document would also not include any accepted principles on the restoration of communications – another critical issue – especially on the question of passport and border controls between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

According to Azerbaijani logic, the signature of such a “framework agreement” will significantly decrease tensions and pave the way for more constructive negotiations to find solutions for the thornier issues. It also argues that a contrario the absence of any peace agreement will increase the likelihood of military flare-ups and will keep the situation volatile – thus hinting that if Armenia refuse to sign the “framework agreement,” Azerbaijan is justified in using military means, as it has done before to successfully achieve its political aims.

Simultaneously, however, Azerbaijan continues to demand a de facto extraterritorial corridor via Armenia to connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. This position was once again emphasized by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during his January 10th, 2024 interview with local media. Aliyev stated that no border, passport, or customs controls should exist for goods that pass via Armenia from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan; otherwise, Azerbaijan will not open any communications with Armenia and “Armenia will continue to be a dead end.” In the same interview, Aliyev said that Azerbaijan will not agree to any guarantors for the future peace agreement.

Interestingly, while Azerbaijan argues that there should be no controls to connect one part of Azerbaijan with another, Baku has never demanded a lifting of passport, border, and customs controls via Iran to reach Nakhchivan from Azerbaijan proper. Azerbaijan has used Iranian territory for the last 30 years to connect with Nakhchivan – recently coming to an agreement with Iran to establish new routes – but there was no talk of Iran granting a passport-, border-, and customs-free regime for Azerbaijani persons and cargo traveling via Iranian territory to reach Nakhchivan.

Azerbaijan sent its latest version of suggestions for a peace agreement to Armenia in late December 2023, and Yerevan shared its version with Baku on January 4th, 2024. Armenia’s Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Security Council recently mentioned that Armenia saw some regression in the latest Azerbaijani proposal shared with Armenia.

There are significant doubts that the “framework agreement” would bring lasting stability. Rather, it would keep the door open for future military escalation. Azerbaijan’s ever-changing demands and constant threat to use force makes it clear that Baku is not interested in peace in the South Caucasus – even a peace that is based on the complete victory of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a so-called “victor’s peace.”

The logic behind Azerbaijan’s behavior

From a domestic political perspective, Aliyev may need to maintain external enemies as a tool to continue rallying the population behind his rule. In this scenario, the concept of “Western Azerbaijan” may replace the “liberation of Karabakh” as a new national pursuit. The “Western Azerbaijan” concept was actively developed after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, and it cites significant parts of Armenia as historical Azerbaijani lands that Baku should reclaim control of. Since the early 2000s, raising the Azerbaijani flag in Nagorno-Karabakh served just such a purpose, which united the population around the country’s ruling family despite the inequality, corruption, and lack of fundamental freedoms in Azerbaijan. Now, as Aliyev oversaw a military parade in Stepanakert – with no Armenians present – on the 20th anniversary of his election as president, this dream has been fulfilled.

However, the ruling family needs a new dream to secure the loyalty of the population for the next two decades, and the concept of “Western Azerbaijan” or the “return of Azerbaijanis to their homeland/territory in today’s Armenia” may well serve that purpose. In this scenario, any peace agreement with Armenia –   regardless of the content – would kill the concept of “Western Azerbaijan.” As Aliyev spoke about the new era for Azerbaijan after his victory in the February 2024 snap presidential elections, animosity towards Armenia and Armenians is likely to continue as a central pillar of this new era – this time focusing on Armenia proper.

Another explanation could be Azerbaijan’s desire to continue to weaken Armenia and ultimately render it a non-viable state by creating a land border between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory and closing the Armenian border with Iran, thus realizing the century-old pan-Turkic dream.

There could be other explanations too, but one thing is clear: Nagorno-Karabakh was only one piece of the bigger puzzle of Azerbaijan’s – and probably Turkey’s – strategy towards Armenia. Even if Armenia were to accept all its demands, Azerbaijan would most likely not sign a peace agreement and will continue to dig up new demands. It will be a never-ending story, continuing to weaken Armenia.

What next in Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations?

Election campaigns will soon begin in Russia, the EU, and later the US. If everything seems clear as far as the results of the March 2024 presidential elections in Russia are concerned, the situation in both the EU and the US is more complex. In particular, the possible return of Donald Trump to the White House will significantly impact US foreign policy, including in the South Caucasus. In recent years, Baku has proved time and again that it is ready to use military force to compel Armenia to make concessions and to gain advantages by controlling strategic heights inside Armenia.

The incursions of May and November 2021 and September 2022 into Armenia proper as well as the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 are proof of this strategy. As Azerbaijan continues to reference “eight Azerbaijani villages still occupied by Armenia,” it may launch limited military operations under the guise of self-defense actions “to liberate Azerbaijani territories.”

As the prospects for a peace agreement grow increasingly elusive, mediators and facilitators should put more effort into conflict management, seeking to avoid military escalations by facilitating talks even without any hope for short-term breakthroughs. In the current environment, the only way to stabilize the region is to decrease the military imbalance between Armenia and Azerbaijan and create conditions for Armenia to be able to defend itself. If Azerbaijan remains likely to use force against Armenia to compel it to accept what it wants, there will be neither efficient negotiations nor stability. The public threats of sanctions by the EU and the US against Azerbaijan in case of any new military aggression against Armenia could also play a stabilizing role. Meanwhile, as Armenia and Azerbaijan brace themselves for another period of uncertainty, more efforts should be put into confidence and security-building measures.

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