The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and ensuing geopolitical developments revealed the paradoxes behind Türkiye’s motivations in the South Caucasus. This report examines the main directions of Türkiye’s foreign policy in the region, building on insights from desktop research, 18 interviews, and other convening opportunities. Key findings Policy recommendations
A few months after reaching their peak in August 2024, Russian-Azerbaijani relations took a nosedive with the downing of an Azerbaijani plane by Russia in December 2024. But rather than being the originating source of the discord, the “aircraft crisis” has served as the pretext for deteriorating relations. The frosting of relations allowed Baku to resolve key issues in the region and keep Moscow at a distance from the processes. This was the result of a strategic mistake by Russia, which, after accepting the post-2023 status quo, assumed that Azerbaijan would become Russia’s new main partner in the South Caucasus. An important indicator of the ongoing mistrust and confrontation is the arrest in October 2025 of Ramiz Mehdiyev, former head of the Azerbaijani presidential administration, accused of preparing a pro-Russian coup. If some degree of political détente began after the Washington Summit in August, it is not likely to last because the disagreements between the countries are deep-rooted, and the geopolitical balance cannot be rolled back in line with Russians’ wishes. 2022–2024: The rise of Russian-Azerbaijani friendship Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan were on a high from 2022 to 2024. The signing of the Declaration on Allied Interaction in February 2022 strengthened the ties between the countries. Moscow saw it as a great diplomatic success with a new ally emerging in the South Caucasus, in addition to Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member Armenia. In addition, Moscow viewed this Declaration as balancing Turkey’s position in the context of strengthening the alliance between Baku and Ankara after the Shusha Declaration of June 2021. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev understood then that he needed to upgrade relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin to achieve Azerbaijan’s regional ultimate objectives of controlling Nagorno-Karabakh without Russian peacekeepers and opening the so-called “Zangezur corridor” more assertively. In this sense, the most important point in the Declaration for Baku was Russia’s confirmation of its recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. The two-day state visit of President Putin to Azerbaijan in August 2024 was the peak of good relations between the neighbors. The state visit took place four months after Baku had seen Russian peacekeepers withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh. The agreements signed then, the declared intention of Baku to draw closer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS intergovernmental organization, as well as informal discussions between Putin and Aliyev at the latter’s residence, were all indicators of reinforced ties between Russia and Azerbaijan. Additionally, Moscow and Baku announced that 2022 Declaration had been implemented in practice. During the same visit in 2024, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, to Azerbaijan’s delight, stated that “Armenia is sabotaging the opening of transport communications.” Obviously, Moscow and Baku sought to impose the implementation of Article 9 of the trilateral statement of November 2020 (calling for all economic and transport communications in the region to be unblocked), while they both violated or failed to fulfill the remainder of the trilateral statement. However, this did not work out, due to multiple dynamics, including Armenia’s unwillingness to implement article 9, Iran’s tough reaction to Lavrov’s statement and later to the Washington Declaration of August 2025 laying out plans for the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). Given the closeness between Putin and Aliyev and their experience of solving potential flare-ups between them (indeed, the downing of a Russian military helicopter over Armenia by Azerbaijan in November 2020 and the killing of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 were both resolved swiftly), the airplane crash in December 2024 could have been resolved in the same vein. It could therefore be argued that the downing of the Azerbaijani aircraft was not the real cause but a pretext for relations to deteriorate. The causes may lie elsewhere. Possible causes of the crisis: A weakened Russia and uncomfortable interdependencies In Azerbaijan’s case, there were a number of possible reasons for the crisis with Russia. First, Baku has sought to play in a “higher league” as a middle power. Such an endeavor presupposes, among other things, challenging more powerful actors. One of these was France, and Azerbaijan launched a “decolonization” campaign aimed at creating problems for Paris. A similar attempt became possible against Moscow, as Russia, bogged down in Ukraine, proved unable to project influence in the larger post-Soviet space. The authorities in Azerbaijan likely saw an opportunity to establish relations with Russia on a more equal footing rather than skewed in Russia’s favor. A second possible motivation for Azerbaijan to escalate tensions with Russia lies in Baku’s deliberate attempt to distance Russia from the South Caucasus. Given Russia’s complicated relationship with Armenia, its growing friction with Azerbaijan, and its focus on the war in Ukraine, its capacity to influence regional dynamics has become increasingly constrained. This shift creates an opportunity for Baku to change the regional status quo as it did in 2023 with the fallout of Nagorno-Karabakh. To achieve its new goal—opening the “corridor” to Nakhijevan through Armenia—Baku did not get Yerevan to agree through Moscow’s blame during the August 2024 visit. Therefore Baku saw the need to engage new external players to distance Moscow from the equation. Importantly for Moscow, Baku has not joined the Western sanctions policy following the war in Ukraine. Azerbaijan’s holding back from the West’s sanctions may well explain why Baku was included in the strategic economic projects announced by Russia and Iran. For Russia, the deterioration of relations with “one of the key allies in the region” would jeopardize the implementation of such strategic initiatives, including the International North–South Transport Corridor. Subsequent statements by Moscow that “certain forces want to cause a rift in relations with Baku” indicate a desire to shift responsibility for the root causes of the crisis from Russia and Azerbaijan to external players, to make it easier to save face and restore relations to where they were. For instance, during his meeting with Aliyev in October 2025, Putin blamed Ukrainian drones for the disaster. Azerbaijan played that part, too, “balancing”
Azerbaijan’s Calculated Confrontation with Russia: From Tension to Advantage Read More »
The publication was originally published on the ORF America website. I. INTRODUCTION The South Caucasus – home to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – is a small but geopolitically important region, prone to intensifying competition between regional and global powers. It is also at a strategic crossroads between Europe, Middle East, and Asia. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, which was followed by the expulsion of 120,000 ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan’s forcible takeover of the entire region in September 2023, has significantly shifted the regional balance of power in favor of Azerbaijan. Baku not only has a considerable military and geographical advantage over Yerevan, but also a strong backer in Turkey. Meanwhile, Armenia’s relations with its traditional security guarantor, Russia, have become difficult as it failed to meet its security obligations vis-à-vis Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. This power imbalance has made regional security volatile and susceptible to renewed conflict. At the same time, the decline of Russia’s influence as well as a need for alternative transport routes to connect Asia with Europe have intensified geopolitical competition in the region. Connectivity projects are at the heart of this competition, involving the interests of Russia, Iran, Turkey, India, China and the United States. Following the 2020 War, Azerbaijan has been advancing the project of the so-called “Zangezur corridor,” by which it implies an extraterritorial land connection through the Southern province of Armenia, Syunik (bordering Iran), to connect Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan bordering Turkey, short of Armenian control. Betting on its military advantage, Azerbaijan has threatened to use force to occupy the Armenian sovereign territory to establish that “corridor”. Armenia, which has two borders closed (with Turkey and Azerbaijan) and only two open (with Georgia and Iran), is in favor of not only opening transportation routes from East to West, but also North to South in the framework of its Crossroads of Peace project, which advocates for sovereign control of each country over its section of territory. Armenia also strongly objects to any extraterritorial corridor, which would infringe on its territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as threaten its vital border with Iran. The most notable development with regards to this dispute has been the landmark declaration signed by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States on August 8, 2025 in Washington. The declaration stipulates a road passing through Armenia, with Armenian control and envisages the presence of American companies. However, the dispute around the status and implementation of this road continues. While Armenia’s leadership is pursuing a peace agenda, it is at the same time enhancing its self-defense capacity to safeguard its borders and to deter any possible aggression from Azerbaijan. To this end, Armenia has been reforming its army, boosting its own military-industrial complex (launching serial production of fifth-generation weapons, among other things), and pursuing a diversification strategy by acquiring new partners in the defense sector. One of the most important new partners of Armenia in this field has been India. India-Armenia relations have been developing in recent years – there has been an unprecedented number of high-level visits, boosting bilateral trade and most importantly defense ties, as India has become Armenia’s major weapons provider. This partnership merits greater attention. This article will analyze the broader security and geopolitical context in the region, competing geopolitical interests and connectivity projects, and provide an overview into the India-Armenia partnership, anchored in military cooperation and shared interests, which contributes to the balance of power in the region. II. GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS The South Caucasus is a microcosm of geopolitical competition which reflects the interests and the changing dynamics of regional and global powers. Historically Russia, Turkey, and Iran have been competing for influence in the region, with Russia being the dominant power. Russia’s strategic partnership with Armenia (1997) as well as Armenia’s membership of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) entailed an obligation to protect Armenia’s territorial integrity in case of an attack. Russia had been the leading mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and it helped forge the trilateral statement of November 9 between Yerevan, Baku, and Moscow, which ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. Russia has been in favor of opening regional communications based on that agreement. After 2020, preconditioned largely by the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia’s presence in the region began to decline. The ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians despite the presence of the Russian peacekeepers and the subsequent withdrawal of the latter from the region, the inaction of Russia and the CSTO during the multiple military incursions by Azerbaijan into Armenia in 2021-2023 (when Azerbaijan occupied at least 200 square kilometers (125 square miles) of sovereign Armenian territory), coupled with other developments, have demonstrated this trend. This has created a power vacuum, which has prompted regional as well as external powers to establish or increase their presence in the South Caucasus. It must be mentioned, however, that Russia has not made a full withdrawal (the Russian military base in Armenia is one example) and may make a comeback in the South Caucasus in the future. Turkey, which assisted Azerbaijan militarily in the 2020 War, has forged a stronger strategic partnership with its long-time ally. Istanbul fully supports Azerbaijan’s version of the “Zangezur corridor” as it is also an important milestone for Turkey’s own goals of spreading its influence in the South Caucasus and the Caspian region, all the way to Central Asia. The “corridor” could ultimately serve as a “new integration line extending to the Turkic world from Turkey,” according to President Erdogan of Turkey. While Iran does not have similar ambitions, it regards the South Caucasus as a region of its vital national interests. Iran is primarily interested in the security of its borders, and in the development of transportation routes both with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iran has consistently voiced its strong opposition to any infringement on Armenia’s territorial integrity and signaled that any attempts to change the Armenia-Iran border are a red line. Israel, on the other hand, has sided with Azerbaijan, with which it has a
India and the South Caucasus: Infrastructure, Arms, and Geopolitical Competition Read More »
Updated on August 14, 2025 This APRI Armenia Analysis outlines the implications of this step forward for Armenia, Azerbaijan, their long-running peace process, and relations with their regional neighbors. While progress has been made toward a more stable South Caucasus, especially on the thorny issue of transit links, how the details will be interpreted and implemented, as well as how the regional powers will respond, will test the success of the renewed US involvement in the peace process. On August 8, 2025, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the United States signed a Joint Declaration (hereafter the “Joint Declaration” or “Declaration”) during a summit in Washington, DC (hereafter the “Washington Summit”). The Declaration sets forth the establishment of “unimpeded connectivity between the main part of Azerbaijan and (…) Nakhijevan through the territory of (…) Armenia with reciprocal benefits for international and intra-state connectivity for Armenia” through Azerbaijan. It also states that Armenia “will work with the United States and mutually determined third parties to set forth a framework for the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) connectivity project” in its territory. The US-led agreement offers a solution to a long-standing dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over how and under what circumstances they would initiate transit links between their two countries. A ceasefire statement signed in November 2020 by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia, after 44 days of intense hostilities, stipulated that transit links between the two countries would be restored, with the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service responsible for overseeing the transport connections, but with Armenia and Azerbaijan disagreeing over the management and control of the routes. The solution put forth in Washington could give American entities the responsibility for building and managing transit routes for travelers across southern Armenia, in collaboration with Armenian authorities. According to Armenian officials, passport control and customs checks would be carried out by Armenian state institutions, with American support in building Armenia’s border and customs services’ capacities. Security, according to Prime Minister Pashinyan’s press interview, would be ensured by Armenia while American investment companies might have their own security providers in addition to the jurisdiction of the Armenian police, National Security Service, and legal system. Alongside the Joint Declaration, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan initialed the text of an agreement to establish peace and normalize relations between the two countries. The initialing signifies a commitment to finalize the peace deal in the future, although there has been no timeline yet announced. Armenia and Azerbaijan also signed bilateral memoranda of understanding with the US. For Armenia, those agreements would bring increased US involvement in the fields of energy security, infrastructure development under the Armenian government’s Crossroads of Peace project, and technologies related to artificial intelligence and semiconductors. For Azerbaijan, ties with the US would expand with the establishment of a strategic partnership, which would include greater cooperation on defense, digital technologies, and energy. What Are the Implications for Armenia? The Joint Declaration significantly reduces the risk of military escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the near term, allowing Yerevan to continue its efforts toward economic development and improving its defense capabilities. Greater partnership with the US on energy security, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors, in addition to what is already envisaged in the umbrella Strategic Partnership Charter, will likely boost those sectors of the Armenian economy. The Armenian government can publicly explain the benefits these deals would bring for Armenian businesses, as it did in the announcement of the Firebird AI project. It is worth noting that economic relations with Russia, the number one trade partner of Armenia, and with Iran may be altered by the move toward closer cooperation with the US. The unblocking of trade and transit with Azerbaijan—particularly if it unlocks trade and unfreezes diplomatic relations with Turkey—would create new challenges and opportunities for Armenia’s economy. Among other things, it may decrease exclusive dependencies, particularly on Russia. Absent a common understanding of the specifics and ownership of how the Joint Declaration will materialize, some vulnerabilities exist such as the potential for differences in legal interpretations and disputes on the ground during the build-up of the TRIPP. The TRIPP concept needs an implementation framework that will include coordination mechanisms, clarity on the funding plans, and potential deconfliction and mediation mechanisms. Importantly, Armenia has consistently stressed, including recently, that its border and connection with Iran should not be affected by any transit routes passing through Armenia. Should the proper functioning of their mutual border be negatively affected, this could jeopardize the new TRIPP. For the overall proposal to gain greater support, there needs to be clarification around the reciprocal trade route across Azerbaijan. While the Joint Declaration mentions “reciprocal benefits,” which implies that Armenian citizens and goods would benefit from passage through Azerbaijan, the language on how this will work has been vague. If it were to occur, access across Azerbaijan would be managed by Azerbaijani authorities, with no involvement of third parties to provide security or guarantee greater safety for Armenian travelers. This would be perceived as an imbalanced outcome and a deep concession from the Armenian side. The release of Armenian prisoners held in Baku, and the right of return and other protections for ethnic Armenians displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh, were not mentioned in the documents signed in Washington. Some reference to the latter could have been expected, given that President Trump had stated during the 2024 electoral campaign that he would support ending the persecution of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. The joint appeal by Armenia and Azerbaijan to dissolve the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group (a negotiation platform created in 1992 to generate a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) will limit opportunities to raise issues related to the rights of that population or the circumstances of their forced removal by Azerbaijan in 2023. Moreover, since the peace agreement includes an article on withdrawing legal cases from international courts, Armenians will have few opportunities for the redress of human rights violations. This will anger segments
The Washington Summit: Implications for Armenia and the Region Read More »
Profound shifts in the geopolitical dynamics of the South Caucasus, driven by the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the onset of the Russia-Ukraine War, have shaped the Armenian government’s pursuit of foreign policy diversification. This report analyzes key developments in and around Armenian foreign policy from November 2020—the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War—through March 2025. It also offers recommendations to guide the overall trajectory of Armenian foreign policy, both broadly and at the level of specific bilateral relationships. The report is based on extensive desk research and draws on a wide range of publications, official statements, and conducting more than 25 interviews with Armenian officials, as well as Armenian and foreign experts focusing on the region. Executive Summary The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, the onset of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, and Azerbaijan’s military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 disrupted the regional status quo. In light of the repeated incursions by Azerbaijan and in the absence of a tangible response from Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Armenian government intensified its foreign policy diversification efforts. It sought to deepen diplomatic and military cooperation with new and existing partners, notably India, France, the EU, and the US, while opening multiple embassies worldwide. Deepening Diversification for Greater Deterrence: Recommendations
The publication was originally published in IRAS. The geopolitics of the South Caucasus remains dynamic. A new, albeit temporary, status quo emerged after September 2023, when Azerbaijan took control of Nagorno-Karabakh through military action. This led to the mass displacement of the Armenian population and the subsequent withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers. Baku’s current initiatives pose significant challenges to regional stability. Chief among them is the proposed “Zangezur corridor,” which, in the short term, is an attack on Armenia’s territorial integrity and, in the long term, is important in terms of Iran’s security. Another contentious initiative is the concept of “Western Azerbaijan,” an irredentist project aimed at establishing an Azerbaijani-Turkish presence in the South Caucasus at Armenia’s expense, similar to Baku’s decades-old idea of “Southern Azerbaijan,” a territorial claim to Iran’s northwestern provinces. This destabilizing agenda, intended to reshape the regional balance, must be met with a constructive response focused on preserving peace and maintaining stability. Regionalization in the South Caucasus: Challenges and Dynamics After the shift in the regional balance following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Turkey proposed the creation of a consultative format known as “3+3,” involving the three South Caucasus states (Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) and their neighbors (Iran, Russia, and Turkey). This framework allowed Ankara to play a more active role in regional affairs while opening similar opportunities for Iran. Russia also viewed the format favorably, as it excluded the West from participation. However, the main challenge in the South Caucasus is not the West, which cannot directly and actively shape regional developments, but Turkey, which can influence conditions on the ground. The legitimization of Ankara within the “3+3” framework may have destabilizing consequences, as Turkey continues to advance destructive initiatives. A relevant precedent can be found in Syria: Within the framework of the “Astana format,” Turkey committed to separate terrorist groups from the opposition. In practice, however, Ankara provided full support to terrorist factions, facilitating their rise to power by force in 2024. The same year, in 2024, a representative office of so-called “Western Azerbaijan,” a Baku-backed political project aimed against Armenia and Iran, was established in Turkey, accompanied by statements endorsing the proposed “Zangezur corridor”—both initiatives threatening regional stability. Meanwhile, the Armenia–Turkey and Armenia–Azerbaijan borders remain closed, as Ankara refuses to normalize relations with Yerevan until all of Baku’s demands are met. Actual regionalization requires, at a minimum, the unblocking of transportation and communications links based on common principles applicable to all states and the normalization of relations through peace treaties or interstate agreements. With regard to the reopening of transit routes, Armenia, Iran, and Russia oppose the “corridor” approach for different reasons. However, Yerevan and Tehran’s positions are more closely aligned, while Moscow remains focused on implementing Article 9 of the 2020 ceasefire agreement, ensuring the presence of Russian border guards along key transport routes. At the same time, Iran has sought to counterbalance the so-called “Zangezur corridor” proposal by advancing the “Aras corridor,” offering Baku a more feasible route to Georgia. This dynamic positions Iran as a key regional arbiter with the potential to mediate competing interests. Beyond the so-called “Zangezur corridor” and “Western Azerbaijan” initiatives, additional destabilizing factors threaten regional stability in the South Caucasus and beyond. These include the presence of Israeli military and intelligence operations in Azerbaijan, which Iran perceives as a security threat; Baku’s rising military expenditure; and Azerbaijan’s expanding military and defense cooperation with Pakistan, which provides offensive weaponry, including attack aircraft, that could reinforce regional power asymmetries. These and other developments have reshaped the strategic balance in the South Caucasus and risk provoking new confrontations that could undermine regionalization efforts and the establishment of lasting peace. Potential Mechanisms for Regional Stability The election of Donald Trump has added to the great uncertainty in global geopolitics. On the one hand, tensions within the Euro-Atlantic alliance are evident, alongside a visible inclination of the United States toward normalizing relations with Russia. On the other hand, the US approach toward Iran continues to range between “maximum pressure” and openness to negotiations. This volatile geopolitical environment creates a “gray zone” that could encourage strategic adventurism. The shifting balance of power in the Middle East—particularly following the change in leadership in Syria—has opened new opportunities for Turkey to expand its influence in the South Caucasus. Meanwhile, for Israel, positioning itself to strike Iran remains a central foreign policy objective. The Azerbaijan–Israel and Azerbaijan–Turkey military-political alliances and the trilateral military cooperation between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan necessitate a counterbalancing framework in the South Caucasus. However, multilateral and bilateral cooperation mechanisms should not focus solely on countering these alliances but should instead foster regional stability. One key step toward mitigating regional issues would be signing a new agreement between Armenia and Iran to serve as the foundation for their bilateral relations. The current framework—the Declaration on Principles and Aims of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, signed in 1992—is outdated, given the evolving regional and global context. A new strategic partnership agreement could modernize Armenia–Iran relations and help balance the dynamic between Iran and Azerbaijan, which remains strong despite periodic diplomatic crises. For Armenia, such an agreement would also reinforce its commitment to regional stability, complementing its Strategic Partnership Declaration with Georgia (signed in January 2024), its Strategic Partnership Charter with the United States (signed in January 2025) and the forthcoming new Partnership Agenda with the European Union. Based on this renewed Armenian-Iranian framework, a series of initiatives to maintain regional stability could be developed and implemented. Another potential mechanism for ensuring security in the South Caucasus is establishing a regional balance of interests. Key infrastructure projects, such as the railroad component of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Iran–Russia gas pipeline, and the interconnection of Iranian and Russian electricity grids, are set to pass through Azerbaijani territory. These developments could result in Baku gaining a logistical monopoly over transportation and energy in the region. Diversifying infrastructure routes and projects is essential to mitigate these risks. One possible counterbalance
A New Balance in the South Caucasus: The Role of Iran Read More »
The expert opinion was originally published by Rondeli Foundation. Executive Summary Russia’s advances in Ukraine in 2024 and the first months of 2025, coupled with the new US administration’s decision to enter direct negotiations with Russia to end the war, have increased the likelihood that Russia, in the short- to mid-term, will expand its influence in the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus.The United States’ shifting focus from Europe to Asia–Pacific, diverging policy views between Washington and Brussels, and the socioeconomic challenges European Union member states face will likely diminish the role of the United States and the EU in the region.Meanwhile, ad hoc partnerships and minilateral groupings prioritizing regionalism prevail over larger, more formal multilateral coalitions.Armenia can only adapt its foreign policy in 2025 to the evolving regional geopolitical landscape and the looming risk of regional instability. The primary goals of Armenian foreign policy should be: This approach will allow Armenia to safeguard its sovereignty, navigate shifting power dynamics, and seize emerging opportunities while minimizing the risk of antagonizing regional and global powers.
Armenian Foreign Policy in 2025: The Return of Geography Read More »
On March 13, 2025, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, followed by Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issued statements that the text of the peace agreement between the two countries had been finalized. This development follows more than two years of bilateral negotiations amid an increasingly uncertain and volatile world order. This APRI Armenia Analysis examines the significance of this step and its implications for Armenia’s security and regional stability. What Happened On March 13, 2025, the Azerbaijani and Armenian Ministries of Foreign Affairs issued unilateral statements announcing the finalization of the text of a peace agreement. Armenia expressed readiness to begin consultations on the timing of and venue for its signing. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, stated that an amendment to Armenia’s Constitution was a prerequisite for signing the negotiated agreement and emphasized the necessity of formally abolishing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)’s Minsk Group. Following these announcements, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense has been issuing a dozen statements since March 16 (such as Statement 1, Statement 2, Statement 3, Statement 4, and Statement 5) claiming that Armenian troops had opened fire on Azerbaijani positions along the border in Armenia’s Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces. These statements appear to seek a pretext for justifying a new Azerbaijani attack. The European Union’s mission in Armenia has refuted these claims, stating that it had observed no active incidents along the border as of March 17. The Armenian Ministry of Defense also denied the allegations. Amid growing concerns about a possible escalation, Armenia’s prime minister issued a special statement, asserting that the Armenian Armed Forces had neither a reason nor orders to violate the ceasefire. Armenia’s Peace Efforts: A Sisyphean Struggle By agreeing to finalize the agreement, Armenia made another significant concession to facilitate peace. For months, the draft agreement had stalled due to Azerbaijani demands, framed as two outstanding articles: the mutual withdrawal of legal cases from international courts and the nondeployment of foreign forces along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. On the first point, both countries have filed cases against each other at the International Court of Justice and in the European Court of Human Rights. But Armenia’s ratification of the Rome Statute presents a potential risk for Azerbaijani leaders, who could face trial for crimes against humanity committed in 2022 and 2023. The second outstanding article implicitly targeted the European Union’s Mission in Armenia, an initiative that Baku has repeatedly denigrated—and at times threatened—including in President Aliyev’s January 7 television interview. Despite these objections, the EU mission has significantly strengthened human security at the border. Previously, Armenia had offered to remove European observers from delimited areas of the border while maintaining their presence along nondelimited sections, viewing them as a deterrent against potential escalations by Azerbaijan. The Armenian government had also stated that it was willing to withdraw the lawsuits from international courts—if convinced that a stable and lasting peace had been established—otherwise seeing them as a leverage against Azerbaijan. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, Armenia’s withdrawal of legal cases would formally close the chapter on developments from 2020 to 2023, absolving Azerbaijan of accusations of violating international law during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, 2021 and 2022 incursions into Armenia and the 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh and the forced displacement of Armenians. The removal of the European observers from the Armenia–Azerbaijan border aligns with Azerbaijan’s broader strategy of eliminating mediators, facilitators, and observers between the two countries. This helps Azerbaijan to fully exploit the power imbalance between sides without any external intervention. Notably, the draft agreement contains no references to Armenian prisoners of war held in Azerbaijani prisons. It also does not address the contentious issue of transportation and communications links, which both agreed to remove from the agreement and discuss separately in 2024—just as they did for the border demarcation and delimitation, signing a separate document to regulate the delimitation commissions. The entire text has been finalized amid a growing information campaign in the Azerbaijani press accusing Armenia of preparing an attack in April 2025. As Baku has been working to justify a new “preventive” military operation, coupled with intensive military drills, Armenia’s acceptance of Azerbaijan’s proposals on the two unresolved articles appears to be an attempt to deprive Baku of any pretext for invasion and to counter the narrative that Armenia is an uncooperative negotiating partner. The move also serves as a direct message to Armenians and the international community that Armenia remains committed to peace—even at the cost of additional painful concessions. Meanwhile, Baku continues to insist on two preconditions before signing the draft peace agreement, as emphasized once again in its latest official statement. The question remains: Has the region made real progress toward peace when Azerbaijan still maintains nonnegotiable conditions for signing the now-finalized agreement? Where Do We Go From Here? As we have said before, Azerbaijan appears to have no genuine intention of making peace with Armenia—or, by extension, helping establish peace in the region. Contrary to the statement of December 2023 and allegedly what was planned between the two parties, the recent announcement was not bilateral. Baku has set two preconditions for signing the peace agreement: Armenia must amend its Constitution and other laws to remove alleged territorial claims against Azerbaijan, and the OSCE Minsk Group must be dissolved. While Armenia is open to considering the latter, the Armenian government and the country’s Constitutional Court maintain that the Constitution contains no territorial claims against Azerbaijan or any other state. Beyond these two preconditions, Azerbaijan has also set additional conditions that it considers separate from the peace agreement: Two other conditions, raised last year but referenced less frequently in recent Azerbaijani statements, include: Azerbaijan appears intent on undermining the positive environment created by Armenia’s concessions. The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry’s recent statements reinforce its aggressive stance toward Armenia and highlight the stabilizing role of the European Union’s mission—a security measure that Yerevan had already agreed to modify, if not remove. Azerbaijan is keeping the window open for further escalation and may launch an attack anytime.
Armenia and Azerbaijan Agreed on a Draft Peace Agreement: What Comes Next? Read More »
In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a 20-year Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, encompassing the political, economic, and military sectors and potentially reshaping the dynamics of power and influence in the South Caucasus. The agreement, unprecedented in scope, underscores Moscow and Tehran’s growing alignment amid shifting global alliances. Its significance extends beyond bilateral relations, carrying profound geopolitical consequences for the region. The treaty focuses on deepening economic and security ties. Sanctioned Moscow and Tehran have found common ground in forging alternative trade routes, circumventing Western financial systems, and reinforcing military cooperation. The South Caucasus, a historically contested space where Russian, Turkish, and Persian influences have long competed for dominance, is a natural focal point of this evolving partnership. Global Dimension: Toward a Common Vision Proponents of the liberal paradigm in international relations might interpret the growing partnership between Russia and Iran as a strategic alignment of authoritarian regimes aiming to challenge and undermine the liberal democratic order. In contrast, realist theorists could view this relationship as a pragmatic coalition motivated by mutual survival imperatives in a context marked by geopolitical instability and shifting power dynamics. Beyond theoretical interpretations, the realities of Moscow and Tehran’s strategic calculus suggest a more nuanced picture. Despite the grand rhetoric surrounding their 20-year partnership, the agreement stops short of a formal strategic alliance. Their partnership still competes in key areas—notably in the South Caucasus, where their geopolitical interests are not fully aligned, and in global energy markets, where both are sanctioned suppliers and have limited opportunities. Rather than engaging in outright rivalry, the two countries have signaled a preference for managed coordination, mutual support under Western sanctions, and an unspoken understanding not to undercut each other’s positions, including in the South Caucasus. At the heart of their rapprochement lies a shared vision of a multipolar world that limits external interference while maintaining selective engagement with global markets. This approach is neither full autarky nor complete integration. Instead, Russia and Iran seek to insulate parts of their own and neighboring regions from Western influence while remaining open to economic ties with non-Western states. Their coordinated stance is evident in Iran’s accession to major multilateral frameworks favored by Russia: full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2023, entry into BRICS (the 10-member intergovernmental organization containing Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates) in January 2024, and observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union by December 2024. These alignments reflect not a dramatic shift but a gradual synchronization of worldviews. Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept already outlined a vision of global order that closely mirrors Tehran’s ambitions—one in which sovereignty trumps international norms, regionalism takes precedence over global governance, and Western-led institutions are seen as illegitimate arbiters of international affairs. While neither Moscow nor Tehran seeks total isolation, their partnership signals a broader trend: the consolidation of an alternative geopolitical ecosystem that challenges Western dominance not through open confrontation but through strategic circumvention and parallel institutions. Whether this axis proves resilient or a temporary alignment of convenience will depend on how effectively they navigate their underlying frictions—and how the broader geopolitical landscape evolves in the years ahead. Regional Dimension: South Caucasus as a Strategic Artery and Zone of Interest Russia and Iran’s strategic partnership has clear implications for the South Caucasus, a region they view through three primary lenses: economic, energy, and political. The International North–South Transport Corridor is at the heart of their economic ambitions—a long-envisioned trade route linking Russia to the Persian Gulf and beyond. The Western segment of this route runs through the South Caucasus, with Azerbaijan serving as the crucial transit point. However, a key missing link remains: the 162-kilometer Resht–Astara railway in northern Iran. Moscow has already committed substantial resources to this effort. In 2023, Russia allocated a €1.3 billion intergovernmental loan to finance the railway’s completion connecting Iran to Russia through Azerbaijan. In 2024, a high-level Russian delegation led by deputy prime ministers visited Tehran to reaffirm commitments to the project. Among them was Vitaly Savelyev, appointed in 2024 as the Kremlin’s special representative for INSTC development. His front-row presence at a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian underscored the initiative’s strategic weight for Moscow. The treaty between Russia and Iran highlights the importance of “seamless” transportation along these corridors, but achieving this goal requires overcoming several technical and logistical limitations. Two key issues stand out: first, as mentioned above, completing the Resht–Astara railway by its planned 2028 deadline and integrating Russia’s 1,520-mm rail gauge with Iran’s 1,435-mm gauge, which aligns with European standards; second, electrifying key sections of the route to enhance efficiency. For Moscow and Tehran, the South Caucasus is not merely a transit zone but a vital artery for breaking out of isolation and expanding access to markets. Any regional instability due to unresolved conflicts directly threatens their ambitions. The level of diplomatic and financial investments they have committed suggests a determination to safeguard these routes at all costs. For Armenia, Azerbaijan, and neighboring states, this intensifying Russian-Iranian coordination presents both opportunities and challenges, as regional connectivity is increasingly shaped by the geopolitical calculations of two sanctioned powers seeking alternative economic lifelines. Another crucial common interest for Russia and Iran in the region is energy. After signing the agreement, the parties finalized the route of a planned gas pipeline from Russia to Iran, which will pass through Azerbaijan. According to this agreement, initial capacity is expected to be modest, at about 2 billion cubic meters per year, but it envisions an eventual expansion to 55 billion cubic meters. The agreement carries several strategic implications. First, Iran’s largest gas reserves are concentrated in the south, yet the country’s northern regions still require steady supplies. Moscow may already deliver small volumes of gas to Iran through existing connecting pipelines in Azerbaijan. Swap arrangements could also become relevant in this context. Second, the long-term potential of such a high-capacity pipeline raises the prospect of Russian gas reaching the Indian market. The
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The special report was originally published on ORF website. Introduction The South Caucasus is an important Eurasian political and economic hub, as its transport networks have the potential to facilitate travel across the continent. Control over the South Caucasus grants access to the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea basin, serving as a gateway to Central Asia and the Greater Middle East. Given its strategic importance, regional powers such as Russia, Türkiye, and Iran have vied for influence in the South Caucasus for centuries. In recent years, the demand for alternative transport corridors has surged amid the ongoing Ukraine war, sanctions on Russia, conflicts in the West Asia (Middle East) region, and the resulting difficulties with traditional supply routes such as the Suez Canal. Consequently, the South Caucasus has become increasingly important as a link between Asia, Europe, and Russia. At the same time, the region has experienced volatility from ethnic conflicts and wars. Russia has historically had the greatest influence among the three regional players. However, after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war—which in 2023 resulted in total Azerbaijani control over the region, forced displacement of the Armenian population, and the subsequent withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers in the spring-summer of 2024—Russia’s influence and its role as a security provider has declined. This has resulted in a power vacuum, which several regional powers, primarily Türkiye, are striving to fill. The situation has also created favourable conditions for new players outside the region. For India, there is a unique opportunity to contribute to stability in its extended neighbourhood and to ensure its presence in the strategic communication routes that could be a game-changer in the future. Based on geopolitical considerations, India has prioritised its relations with Armenia, with which it shares interests such as connectivity projects, and common security challenges emanating from the Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Pakistan alliance. It is thus important to analyse the geopolitical rationale behind the emerging India-Armenia relationship. Armenia: An Important Partner for India India and Armenia are ancient civilisations with histories dating back millennia. Armenians’ historic role as merchants ensured trade between India, West Asia, and Europe, and the existence of a vibrant Armenian community in India dating back to the seventeenth century highlights these deep-rooted connections. Armenia, like India, is a democracy, and the two countries also share similarities in terms of societal and family values. Armenia is home to tens of thousands of Indian students and a growing number of labour migrants. India’s vision of the world as one family (Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam) and its stance against legitimising the use of force strongly resonates with the Armenians. Despite numerous attempts at conquest and the Armenian Genocide under the Ottoman Empire, Armenians have managed to maintain their statehood in a highly hostile neighbourhood. This is particularly significant today as neighbouring Azerbaijan is an authoritarian regime that advocates for the use of force to solve conflicts. Ties with countries like Armenia are important for India, as it aims to position itself as a global player and a civilisational power that brings forth its unique vision in international politics and acts as a peace broker. Armenia and India have always maintained friendly political relations. Armenia has consistently supported India’s position on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir in the United Nations (UN) and other international platforms. In turn, India supported Armenia in the UN Security Council following the September 2022 aggression by Azerbaijan. Today, Armenia is the largest buyer of Indian indigenous weapons, and bilateral defence cooperation is growing. Armenia’s success in this regard is also important for India to position itself as a player in the global defence market. Given the growing sectors of Armenia’s economy and its competent workforce, there is ample room to develop mutually beneficial economic ties. Armenia, the only South Caucasus member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), can also act as a bridge between India and the larger Eurasian market. Given its strategic location, Armenia is a balancing factor against Turkish expansionist policies and the pan-Turkic agenda in the South Caucasus and beyond, which carry security implications similarly for India. Due to its location, Armenia can serve as an alternative transit route from India to Europe. As India aspires to be an important pillar in the future multipolar world, having access to the communication routes in this region and passing through a friendly country will be beneficial. As such, it is important for India that the South Caucasus region remains stable and that Armenia maintains its security and territorial integrity. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Power Imbalance as a Source of Regional Instability Following the full-scale war launched by Azerbaijan against the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 2020 and the ethnic cleansing of its Armenian population in 2023, Azerbaijan took control of the entire Nagorno-Karabakh region. “Azerbaijan ensured peace by war,” said President Ilham Aliyev, justifying these actions. This has shifted the regional balance of power in favour of Azerbaijan. It has left Armenia’s southern regions of Syunik and Vayots Dzor vulnerable as Azerbaijan surrounds them from the east and west. This has further added to the geographic and numerical advantage that Azerbaijan already had over Armenia in terms of territory, population, and military power. Azerbaijan launched the 2020 war because it had a qualitative and quantitative military advantage over Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh after investing in its military for years. Notably, Azerbaijan now criticises India and France for supplying arms to Armenia, warning that it may take “serious measures” if threatened. Both India and France have responded by saying it is their right to supply arms to a sovereign country. At the same time, Azerbaijan is continuing its military build-up, steadily increasing its national security and defence budget allocation from US$1.85 billion in 2018 to US$3.77 billion in 2024. In 2023, Azerbaijan increased its military spending by nearly 19.6 percent, and in 2024 by 6 percent, which also includes the upgrade of its air defence systems. Armenia’s 2024 defence budget is three times less, at US$1.37 billion, despite increases in previous years. Azerbaijan also continues posing new territorial and other demands to Armenia pertaining to the country’s internal matters, coupled with a falsification of
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