Geopolitics and Foreign Policy

A New Balance in the South Caucasus: The Role of Iran

Geopolitics and Foreign Policy /

The publication was originally published in IRAS. The geopolitics of the South Caucasus remains dynamic. A new, albeit temporary, status quo emerged after September 2023, when Azerbaijan took control of Nagorno-Karabakh through military action. This led to the mass displacement of the Armenian population and the subsequent withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers. Baku’s current initiatives pose significant challenges to regional stability. Chief among them is the proposed “Zangezur corridor,” which, in the short term, is an attack on Armenia’s territorial integrity and, in the long term, is important in terms of  Iran’s security. Another contentious initiative is the concept of “Western Azerbaijan,” an irredentist project aimed at establishing an Azerbaijani-Turkish presence in the South Caucasus at Armenia’s expense, similar to Baku’s decades-old idea of “Southern Azerbaijan,” a territorial claim to Iran’s northwestern provinces. This destabilizing agenda, intended to reshape the regional balance, must be met with a constructive response focused on preserving peace and maintaining stability. Regionalization in the South Caucasus: Challenges and Dynamics After the shift in the regional balance following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Turkey proposed the creation of a consultative format known as “3+3,” involving the three South Caucasus states (Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) and their neighbors (Iran, Russia, and Turkey). This framework allowed Ankara to play a more active role in regional affairs while opening similar opportunities for Iran. Russia also viewed the format favorably, as it excluded the West from participation. However, the main challenge in the South Caucasus is not the West, which cannot directly and actively shape regional developments, but Turkey, which can influence conditions on the ground. The legitimization of Ankara within the “3+3” framework may have destabilizing consequences, as Turkey continues to advance destructive initiatives. A relevant precedent can be found in Syria: Within the framework of the “Astana format,” Turkey committed to separate terrorist groups from the opposition. In practice, however, Ankara provided full support to terrorist factions, facilitating their rise to power by force in 2024. The same year, in 2024, a representative office of so-called “Western Azerbaijan,” a Baku-backed political project aimed against Armenia and Iran, was established in Turkey, accompanied by statements endorsing the proposed “Zangezur corridor”—both initiatives threatening regional stability. Meanwhile, the Armenia–Turkey and Armenia–Azerbaijan borders remain closed, as Ankara refuses to normalize relations with Yerevan until all of Baku’s demands are met. Actual regionalization requires, at a minimum, the unblocking of transportation and communications links based on common principles applicable to all states and the normalization of relations through peace treaties or interstate agreements. With regard to the reopening of transit routes, Armenia, Iran, and Russia oppose the “corridor” approach for different reasons. However, Yerevan and Tehran’s positions are more closely aligned, while Moscow remains focused on implementing Article 9 of the 2020 ceasefire agreement, ensuring the presence of Russian border guards along key transport routes. At the same time, Iran has sought to counterbalance the so-called “Zangezur corridor” proposal by advancing the “Aras corridor,” offering Baku a more feasible route to Georgia. This dynamic positions Iran as a key regional arbiter with the potential to mediate competing interests. Beyond the so-called “Zangezur corridor” and “Western Azerbaijan” initiatives, additional destabilizing factors threaten regional stability in the South Caucasus and beyond. These include the presence of Israeli military and intelligence operations in Azerbaijan, which Iran perceives as a security threat; Baku’s rising military expenditure; and Azerbaijan’s expanding military and defense cooperation with Pakistan, which provides offensive weaponry, including attack aircraft, that could reinforce regional power asymmetries. These and other developments have reshaped the strategic balance in the South Caucasus and risk provoking new confrontations that could undermine regionalization efforts and the establishment of lasting peace. Potential Mechanisms for Regional Stability The election of Donald Trump has added to the great uncertainty in global geopolitics. On the one hand, tensions within the Euro-Atlantic alliance are evident, alongside a visible inclination of the United States toward normalizing relations with Russia. On the other hand, the US approach toward Iran continues to range between “maximum pressure” and openness to negotiations. This volatile geopolitical environment creates a “gray zone” that could encourage strategic adventurism. The shifting balance of power in the Middle East—particularly following the change in leadership in Syria—has opened new opportunities for Turkey to expand its influence in the South Caucasus. Meanwhile, for Israel, positioning itself to strike Iran remains a central foreign policy objective. The Azerbaijan–Israel and Azerbaijan–Turkey military-political alliances and the trilateral military cooperation between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan necessitate a counterbalancing framework in the South Caucasus. However, multilateral and bilateral cooperation mechanisms should not focus solely on countering these alliances but should instead foster regional stability. One key step toward mitigating regional issues would be signing a new agreement between Armenia and Iran to serve as the foundation for their bilateral relations. The current framework—the Declaration on Principles and Aims of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, signed in 1992—is outdated, given the evolving regional and global context. A new strategic partnership agreement could modernize Armenia–Iran relations and help balance the dynamic between Iran and Azerbaijan, which remains strong despite periodic diplomatic crises. For Armenia, such an agreement would also reinforce its commitment to regional stability, complementing its Strategic Partnership Declaration with Georgia (signed in January 2024), its Strategic Partnership Charter with the United States (signed in January 2025) and the forthcoming new Partnership Agenda with the European Union. Based on this renewed Armenian-Iranian framework, a series of initiatives to maintain regional stability could be developed and implemented. Another potential mechanism for ensuring security in the South Caucasus is establishing a regional balance of interests. Key infrastructure projects, such as the railroad component of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Iran–Russia gas pipeline, and the interconnection of Iranian and Russian electricity grids, are set to pass through Azerbaijani territory. These developments could result in Baku gaining a logistical monopoly over transportation and energy in the region. Diversifying infrastructure routes and projects is essential to mitigate these risks. One possible counterbalance

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Armenian Foreign Policy in 2025: The Return of Geography

Geopolitics and Foreign Policy /

The expert opinion was originally published by Rondeli Foundation. Executive Summary Russia’s advances in Ukraine in 2024 and the first months of 2025, coupled with the new US administration’s decision to enter direct negotiations with Russia to end the war, have increased the likelihood that Russia, in the short- to mid-term, will expand its influence in the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus.The United States’ shifting focus from Europe to Asia–Pacific, diverging policy views between Washington and Brussels, and the socioeconomic challenges European Union member states face will likely diminish the role of the United States and the EU in the region.Meanwhile, ad hoc partnerships and minilateral groupings prioritizing regionalism prevail over larger, more formal multilateral coalitions.Armenia can only adapt its foreign policy in 2025 to the evolving regional geopolitical landscape and the looming risk of regional instability. The primary goals of Armenian foreign policy should be: This approach will allow Armenia to safeguard its sovereignty, navigate shifting power dynamics, and seize emerging opportunities while minimizing the risk of antagonizing regional and global powers.

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Armenia and Azerbaijan Agreed on a Draft Peace Agreement: What Comes Next?

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On March 13, 2025, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, followed by Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issued statements that the text of the peace agreement between the two countries had been finalized. This development follows more than two years of bilateral negotiations amid an increasingly uncertain and volatile world order. This APRI Armenia Analysis examines the significance of this step and its implications for Armenia’s security and regional stability. What Happened On March 13, 2025, the Azerbaijani and Armenian Ministries of Foreign Affairs issued unilateral statements announcing the finalization of the text of a peace agreement. Armenia expressed readiness to begin consultations on the timing of and venue for its signing. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, stated that an amendment to Armenia’s Constitution was a prerequisite for signing the negotiated agreement and emphasized the necessity of formally abolishing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)’s Minsk Group. Following these announcements, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense has been issuing a dozen statements since March 16 (such as Statement 1, Statement 2, Statement 3, Statement 4, and Statement 5) claiming that Armenian troops had opened fire on Azerbaijani positions along the border in Armenia’s Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces. These statements appear to seek a pretext for justifying a new Azerbaijani attack. The European Union’s mission in Armenia has refuted these claims, stating that it had observed no active incidents along the border as of March 17. The Armenian Ministry of Defense also denied the allegations. Amid growing concerns about a possible escalation, Armenia’s prime minister issued a special statement, asserting that the Armenian Armed Forces had neither a reason nor orders to violate the ceasefire. Armenia’s Peace Efforts: A Sisyphean Struggle By agreeing to finalize the agreement, Armenia made another significant concession to facilitate peace. For months, the draft agreement had stalled due to Azerbaijani demands, framed as two outstanding articles: the mutual withdrawal of legal cases from international courts and the nondeployment of foreign forces along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. On the first point, both countries have filed cases against each other at the International Court of Justice and in the European Court of Human Rights. But Armenia’s ratification of the Rome Statute presents a potential risk for Azerbaijani leaders, who could face trial for crimes against humanity committed in 2022 and 2023. The second outstanding article implicitly targeted the European Union’s Mission in Armenia, an initiative that Baku has repeatedly denigrated—and at times threatened—including in President Aliyev’s January 7 television interview. Despite these objections, the EU mission has significantly strengthened human security at the border. Previously, Armenia had offered to remove European observers from delimited areas of the border while maintaining their presence along nondelimited sections, viewing them as a deterrent against potential escalations by Azerbaijan. The Armenian government had also stated that it was willing to withdraw the lawsuits from international courts—if convinced that a stable and lasting peace had been established—otherwise seeing them as a leverage against Azerbaijan. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, Armenia’s withdrawal of legal cases would formally close the chapter on developments from 2020 to 2023, absolving Azerbaijan of accusations of violating international law during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, 2021 and 2022 incursions into Armenia and the 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh and the forced displacement of Armenians. The removal of the European observers from the Armenia–Azerbaijan border aligns with Azerbaijan’s broader strategy of eliminating mediators, facilitators, and observers between the two countries. This helps Azerbaijan to fully exploit the power imbalance between sides without any external intervention.  Notably, the draft agreement contains no references to Armenian prisoners of war held in Azerbaijani prisons. It also does not address the contentious issue of transportation and communications links, which both agreed to remove from the agreement and discuss separately in 2024—just as they did for the border demarcation and delimitation, signing a separate document to regulate the delimitation commissions. The entire text has been finalized amid a growing information campaign in the Azerbaijani press accusing Armenia of preparing an attack in April 2025. As Baku has been working to justify a new “preventive” military operation, coupled with intensive military drills, Armenia’s acceptance of Azerbaijan’s proposals on the two unresolved articles appears to be an attempt to deprive Baku of any pretext for invasion and to counter the narrative that Armenia is an uncooperative negotiating partner. The move also serves as a direct message to Armenians and the international community that Armenia remains committed to peace—even at the cost of additional painful concessions. Meanwhile, Baku continues to insist on two preconditions before signing the draft peace agreement, as emphasized once again in its latest official statement. The question remains: Has the region made real progress toward peace when Azerbaijan still maintains nonnegotiable conditions for signing the now-finalized agreement? Where Do We Go From Here? As we have said before, Azerbaijan appears to have no genuine intention of making peace with Armenia—or, by extension, helping establish peace in the region. Contrary to the statement of December 2023 and allegedly what was planned between the two parties, the recent announcement was not bilateral. Baku has set two preconditions for signing the peace agreement: Armenia must amend its Constitution and other laws to remove alleged territorial claims against Azerbaijan, and the OSCE Minsk Group must be dissolved. While Armenia is open to considering the latter, the Armenian government and the country’s Constitutional Court maintain that the Constitution contains no territorial claims against Azerbaijan or any other state. Beyond these two preconditions, Azerbaijan has also set additional conditions that it considers separate from the peace agreement: Two other conditions, raised last year but referenced less frequently in recent Azerbaijani statements, include: Azerbaijan appears intent on undermining the positive environment created by Armenia’s concessions. The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry’s recent statements reinforce its aggressive stance toward Armenia and highlight the stabilizing role of the European Union’s mission—a security measure that Yerevan had already agreed to modify, if not remove. Azerbaijan is keeping the window open for further escalation and may launch an attack anytime.

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Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership: Implications for the South Caucasus

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In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a 20-year Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, encompassing the political, economic, and military sectors and potentially reshaping the dynamics of power and influence in the South Caucasus. The agreement, unprecedented in scope, underscores Moscow and Tehran’s growing alignment amid shifting global alliances. Its significance extends beyond bilateral relations, carrying profound geopolitical consequences for the region. The treaty focuses on deepening economic and security ties. Sanctioned Moscow and Tehran have found common ground in forging alternative trade routes, circumventing Western financial systems, and reinforcing military cooperation. The South Caucasus, a historically contested space where Russian, Turkish, and Persian influences have long competed for dominance, is a natural focal point of this evolving partnership. Global Dimension: Toward a Common Vision Proponents of the liberal paradigm in international relations might interpret the growing partnership between Russia and Iran as a strategic alignment of authoritarian regimes aiming to challenge and undermine the liberal democratic order. In contrast, realist theorists could view this relationship as a pragmatic coalition motivated by mutual survival imperatives in a context marked by geopolitical instability and shifting power dynamics. Beyond theoretical interpretations, the realities of Moscow and Tehran’s strategic calculus suggest a more nuanced picture. Despite the grand rhetoric surrounding their 20-year partnership, the agreement stops short of a formal strategic alliance. Their partnership still competes in key areas—notably in the South Caucasus, where their geopolitical interests are not fully aligned, and in global energy markets, where both are sanctioned suppliers and have limited opportunities. Rather than engaging in outright rivalry, the two countries have signaled a preference for managed coordination, mutual support under Western sanctions, and an unspoken understanding not to undercut each other’s positions, including in the South Caucasus. At the heart of their rapprochement lies a shared vision of a multipolar world that limits external interference while maintaining selective engagement with global markets. This approach is neither full autarky nor complete integration. Instead, Russia and Iran seek to insulate parts of their own and neighboring regions from Western influence while remaining open to economic ties with non-Western states. Their coordinated stance is evident in Iran’s accession to major multilateral frameworks favored by Russia: full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2023, entry into BRICS (the 10-member intergovernmental organization containing Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates) in January 2024, and observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union by December 2024. These alignments reflect not a dramatic shift but a gradual synchronization of worldviews. Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept already outlined a vision of global order that closely mirrors Tehran’s ambitions—one in which sovereignty trumps international norms, regionalism takes precedence over global governance, and Western-led institutions are seen as illegitimate arbiters of international affairs. While neither Moscow nor Tehran seeks total isolation, their partnership signals a broader trend: the consolidation of an alternative geopolitical ecosystem that challenges Western dominance not through open confrontation but through strategic circumvention and parallel institutions. Whether this axis proves resilient or a temporary alignment of convenience will depend on how effectively they navigate their underlying frictions—and how the broader geopolitical landscape evolves in the years ahead. Regional Dimension: South Caucasus as a Strategic Artery and Zone of Interest Russia and Iran’s strategic partnership has clear implications for the South Caucasus, a region they view through three primary lenses: economic, energy, and political. The International North–South Transport Corridor is at the heart of their economic ambitions—a long-envisioned trade route linking Russia to the Persian Gulf and beyond. The Western segment of this route runs through the South Caucasus, with Azerbaijan serving as the crucial transit point. However, a key missing link remains: the 162-kilometer Resht–Astara railway in northern Iran. Moscow has already committed substantial resources to this effort. In 2023, Russia allocated a €1.3 billion intergovernmental loan to finance the railway’s completion connecting Iran to Russia through Azerbaijan. In 2024, a high-level Russian delegation led by deputy prime ministers visited Tehran to reaffirm commitments to the project. Among them was Vitaly Savelyev, appointed in 2024 as the Kremlin’s special representative for INSTC development. His front-row presence at a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian underscored the initiative’s strategic weight for Moscow. The treaty between Russia and Iran highlights the importance of “seamless” transportation along these corridors, but achieving this goal requires overcoming several technical and logistical limitations. Two key issues stand out: first, as mentioned above, completing the Resht–Astara railway by its planned 2028 deadline and integrating Russia’s 1,520-mm rail gauge with Iran’s 1,435-mm gauge, which aligns with European standards; second, electrifying key sections of the route to enhance efficiency. For Moscow and Tehran, the South Caucasus is not merely a transit zone but a vital artery for breaking out of isolation and expanding access to markets. Any regional instability due to unresolved conflicts directly threatens their ambitions. The level of diplomatic and financial investments they have committed suggests a determination to safeguard these routes at all costs. For Armenia, Azerbaijan, and neighboring states, this intensifying Russian-Iranian coordination presents both opportunities and challenges, as regional connectivity is increasingly shaped by the geopolitical calculations of two sanctioned powers seeking alternative economic lifelines. Another crucial common interest for Russia and Iran in the region is energy. After signing the agreement, the parties finalized the route of a planned gas pipeline from Russia to Iran, which will pass through Azerbaijan. According to this agreement, initial capacity is expected to be modest, at about 2 billion cubic meters per year, but it envisions an eventual expansion to 55 billion cubic meters. The agreement carries several strategic implications. First, Iran’s largest gas reserves are concentrated in the south, yet the country’s northern regions still require steady supplies. Moscow may already deliver small volumes of gas to Iran through existing connecting pipelines in Azerbaijan. Swap arrangements could also become relevant in this context. Second, the long-term potential of such a high-capacity pipeline raises the prospect of Russian gas reaching the Indian market. The

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The Geopolitical Aspects of the India-Armenia Partnership

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The special report was originally published on ORF website. Introduction The South Caucasus is an important Eurasian political and economic hub, as its transport networks have the potential to facilitate travel across the continent. Control over the South Caucasus grants access to the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea basin, serving as a gateway to Central Asia and the Greater Middle East. Given its strategic importance, regional powers such as Russia, Türkiye, and Iran have vied for influence in the South Caucasus for centuries. In recent years, the demand for alternative transport corridors has surged amid the ongoing Ukraine war, sanctions on Russia, conflicts in the West Asia (Middle East) region, and the resulting difficulties with traditional supply routes such as the Suez Canal. Consequently, the South Caucasus has become increasingly important as a link between Asia, Europe, and Russia. At the same time, the region has experienced volatility from ethnic conflicts and wars. Russia has historically had the greatest influence among the three regional players. However, after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war—which in 2023 resulted in total Azerbaijani control over the region, forced displacement of the Armenian population,[1] and the subsequent withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers in the spring-summer of 2024[2]—Russia’s influence and its role as a security provider has declined.[3] This has resulted in a power vacuum, which several regional powers, primarily Türkiye, are striving to fill. The situation has also created favourable conditions for new players outside the region. For India, there is a unique opportunity to contribute to stability in its extended neighbourhood and to ensure its presence in the strategic communication routes that could be a game-changer in the future. Based on geopolitical considerations, India has prioritised its relations with Armenia, with which it shares interests such as connectivity projects, and common security challenges emanating from the Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Pakistan alliance. It is thus important to analyse the geopolitical rationale behind the emerging India-Armenia relationship. Armenia: An Important Partner for India India and Armenia are ancient civilisations with histories dating back millennia. Armenians’ historic role as merchants ensured trade between India, West Asia, and Europe, and the existence of a vibrant Armenian community in India dating back to the seventeenth century highlights these deep-rooted connections.[4] Armenia, like India, is a democracy,[5] and the two countries also share similarities in terms of societal and family values. Armenia is home to tens of thousands of Indian students and a growing number of labour migrants.[6] India’s vision of the world as one family (Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam) and its stance against legitimising the use of force strongly resonates with the Armenians. Despite numerous attempts at conquest and the Armenian Genocide under the Ottoman Empire, Armenians have managed to maintain their statehood in a highly hostile neighbourhood. This is particularly significant today as neighbouring Azerbaijan is an authoritarian regime that advocates for the use of force to solve conflicts.[7] Ties with countries like Armenia are important for India, as it aims to position itself as a global player and a civilisational power that brings forth its unique vision in international politics and acts as a peace broker. Armenia and India have always maintained friendly political relations. Armenia has consistently supported India’s position on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir in the United Nations (UN) and other international platforms. In turn, India supported Armenia in the UN Security Council following the September 2022 aggression by Azerbaijan.[8] Today, Armenia is the largest buyer of Indian indigenous weapons,[9] and bilateral defence cooperation is growing. Armenia’s success in this regard is also important for India to position itself as a player in the global defence market. Given the growing sectors of Armenia’s economy and its competent workforce, there is ample room to develop mutually beneficial economic ties. Armenia, the only South Caucasus member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU),[10] can also act as a bridge between India and the larger Eurasian market. Given its strategic location, Armenia is a balancing factor against Turkish expansionist policies and the pan-Turkic agenda in the South Caucasus and beyond, which carry security implications similarly for India. Due to its location, Armenia can serve as an alternative transit route from India to Europe. As India aspires to be an important pillar in the future multipolar world, having access to the communication routes in this region and passing through a friendly country will be beneficial. As such, it is important for India that the South Caucasus region remains stable and that Armenia maintains its security and territorial integrity. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Power Imbalance as a Source of Regional Instability Following the full-scale war launched by Azerbaijan against the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 2020 and the ethnic cleansing of its Armenian population in 2023,[11] Azerbaijan took control of the entire Nagorno-Karabakh region. “Azerbaijan ensured peace by war,” said President Ilham Aliyev, justifying these actions.[12] This has shifted the regional balance of power in favour of Azerbaijan. It has left Armenia’s southern regions of Syunik and Vayots Dzor vulnerable as Azerbaijan surrounds them from the east and west. This has further added to the geographic and numerical advantage that Azerbaijan already had over Armenia in terms of territory, population, and military power.[13] Azerbaijan launched the 2020 war because it had a qualitative and quantitative military advantage over Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh after investing in its military for years. Notably, Azerbaijan now criticises India and France for supplying arms to Armenia,[14] warning that it may take “serious measures” if threatened. Both India[15] and France[16] have responded by saying it is their right to supply arms to a sovereign country. At the same time, Azerbaijan is continuing its military build-up,  steadily increasing its national security and defence budget allocation from US$1.85 billion in 2018 to US$3.77 billion in 2024.[17] In 2023, Azerbaijan increased its military spending by nearly 19.6 percent,[18] and in 2024 by 6 percent, which also includes the upgrade of its air defence systems.[19] Armenia’s 2024 defence budget is three times less, at US$1.37 billion,[20] despite increases in previous years. Azerbaijan also continues posing new territorial and other demands to Armenia pertaining to the country’s internal matters,[21] coupled with a falsification of history to

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Geopolitical Future of the South Caucasus

The Geopolitical Future of the South Caucasus

Geopolitics and Foreign Policy /

APRI Armenia, in cooperation with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom Yerevan Office, conducted a research project from July to September 2024 to assess the geopolitical future of the South Caucasus. The report analyzed the primary external factors influencing regional geopolitics. It assessed possible future developments in the South Caucasus, focusing on Armenian foreign policy diversification, the prospects of Armenia–Azerbaijan negotiations, the possible future of Georgian foreign policy, and Azerbaijan’s quest for a new foreign policy vision after the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh and the forced displacement of its Armenian population in September 2023.  The key findings are as follows: The transition of the global order from a unipolar world to a more complex security architecture has profoundly impacted South Caucasus geopolitics. The region has become a microcosm of the emerging multipolar world order, with external players—global and regional, as well as newer ones—such as Russia, the United States, the European Union, France, Turkey, Iran, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan having coinciding or conflicting interests in the South Caucasus.  The primary external factor influencing regional geopolitics has been and continues to be the Russia–Ukraine War. It has resulted in a decrease in Russian influence in the South Caucasus and simultaneously increased the region’s significance for Russia as a transit hub to the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Another critical element shaping the unfolding regional geopolitics is the issue of opening communications. Two main projects, the International North–South Transport Corridor and the Middle Corridor, pass through the South Caucasus, tightly intertwinning geopolitics and geoeconomics.  The future of US and EU engagement is another essential factor affecting the region, and various scenarios are possible depending on the policy of the new EU leadership and the US administration following their 2024 respective elections.  It also became apparent from this study that the South Caucasus does not constitute a coherent region from a political and economic point of view. It lacks common institutions and structures, and regional powers often have diverging foreign policy visions. As great power competition has taken center stage in the world order, the South Caucasus faces two possible scenarios—to continue to be a place for regional rivalry with existing and emerging fault lines further fracturing the area or to start the gradual movement toward transforming into a regional strategic convening hub. To facilitate the second scenario, which would benefit the three countries and support the region’s trajectory toward a stable and prosperous future, APRI Armenia recommends starting academic and think tank cooperation between regional states and creating a regional think tank network. Establishing cooperation on issues related to water management and climate change can also be a step toward shaping a coherent and cohesive region.    

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Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy Strategy in the Post-September 2023 Period

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The article was originally published on Mirror Spectator. From September 2020 to September 2023, Azerbaijan surprised many outside Armenia by taking control of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, first during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and later in a military operation in September 2023. The “liberation of Karabakh” was a cornerstone of Azerbaijan’s domestic and foreign policy throughout the post-Soviet period, and resolving the conflict on Azerbaijan’s terms became a national priority for Baku. After September 2023, Azerbaijan faces a new challenge: to formulate a new national idea to gather the subjects around the ruling elite, as articulated by President Ilham Aliyev during his campaign ahead of the February 2024 snap presidential elections. Two directions of new foreign policy supporting the “new national idea” are emerging. The first pillar is the development of relations with the Turkic world, portrayed as “the gateway to Central Asia.” This includes growing relations with Turkey and the Central Asian Turkic countries. In recent years, Azerbaijan has significantly increased its interactions with Central Asian republics, including high-level visits and enhanced economic cooperation. The Middle Corridor, a route that could connect China to Europe via Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, is one of the economic projects jointly promoted by Azerbaijan and Central Asian republics. Azerbaijan has also emphasized the importance of the Organization of Turkic States. President Aliyev has underscored Azerbaijan’s commitment to strengthening relations with Turkic states as a key foreign policy priority, notably during the meeting with parliamentary officials from Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and Hungary. In the same speech Aliyev emphasized that the Turkic world has great power, with its vast geography and potential — encompassing transportation routes, energy resources, human capital, and a growing population and called for unified efforts to transform this potential into a global influence. These themes were reiterated during the informal summit of the heads of state of the Organization of Turkic States, held in Azerbaijan in July 2024. Azerbaijan is taking steps to connect Central Asia with the South Caucasus, potentially establishing a wider Caucasus–Caspian region and offering a new integration model as an alternative to those proposed by the European Union and Russia. Additionally, Azerbaijan has increased its cooperation with the Global South, establishing a strategic partnership with China and officially applying to join BRICS (the intergovernmental organization comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates). The second pillar of Azerbaijan’s new foreign policy strategy is the development of the concept of “Western Azerbaijan,” which claims significant parts of the Armenian territory as historical Azerbaijani lands. The concept serves two primary goals. First, it maintains Armenia and Armenians as the external enemies of Azerbaijani society, rallying the population around President Aliyev’s rule. For the past 20 years, the promise to “liberate Karabakh” was the primary tool used to consolidate support for Aliyev and to divert attention from systemic problems in Azerbaijan, such as unequal distribution of oil and gas wealth, rampant corruption, the lack of political and individual freedoms, and constant human rights violations committed by the regime. However, after the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, this issue ceased to exist, and the concept of “Western Azerbaijan” may replace it as a new rallying point, requiring consolidation around the ruling dynasty. Domestic political considerations are not the only motivation behind this concept. The second goal is geopolitical: to create a “justification” for future attacks against Armenia. These two visions intersect in the creation of a united Turkic world and the concept of Western Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani leaders frequently claim that the Soviet government severed Armenia’s Syunik region, which they refer to as “Zangezur,” from Azerbaijan and handed it to Armenia in 1920. Thus, a potential attack on Syunik in 2025 could be justified as a step toward uniting the Turkic world and establishing “Western Azerbaijan.” The two directions of Azerbaijan’s new foreign policy strategy do not envisage peace with Armenia. This explains Azerbaijan’s tactics in the peace negotiations with Yerevan to make statements signaling progress while undermining it with insurmountable preconditions. Azerbaijan’s leadership needs Armenia as an adversary for domestic and foreign policy reasons. Both directions can also justify new acts of aggression against Armenia. In current circumstances, while continuing its efforts to sign a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, the Armenian government should send a clear message to its international partners about the growing likelihood of new Azerbaijani attacks against Armenia after the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), and negative implications not only for Armenia but for the entire region, including jeopardizing the region’s potential to become a transport hub. As military balance continues to be in favor of Azerbaijan, despite recent armament purchase deals by Armenia, the Armenian government should realistically assess the capacities and willingness of its different foreign partners to deter new Azerbaijani aggression and make its foreign policy decisions based on those calculations.

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Georgian and US Elections: Defining the Next Chapter for the South Caucasus

Geopolitics and Foreign Policy /

The co-author of the report is Robert E. Hamilton, the Head of Research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. The report was originally published on Foreign Policy Research Institute. Executive Summary  The article examines the significant geopolitical ramifications of the upcoming 2024 elections in the Republic of Georgia and the United States, in relation to the South Caucasus. The authors emphasize the region’s importance as a strategic crossroad between Asia and Europe (the New Silk Road), with key energy and trade routes passing through Georgia. The article outlines the uncertain outcome of Georgia’s parliamentary elections (taking place on October 26), detailing three potential scenarios. Each scenario poses different consequences for Georgia’s relations with the West, Russia, and China, particularly in terms of the country’s Euro–Atlantic aspirations. Similarly, the US election will influence the region’s future by influencing the behavior of South Caucasus states and neighboring powers. The Importance of the South Caucasus It has been said of the South Caucasus that it produces more history than it can consume. This observation has been particularly apt in the three-plus decades since its states—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—gained independence from the Soviet Union. This small but strategically important isthmus between the Caspian and Black Seas has seen all three of its countries involved in wars since they became independent. Georgia lost Abkhazia and Ossetia (around 20% of its territory) as a result of the 2008 Russian invasion; Azerbaijan took control of the majority Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh after launching a war in 2020 and ousting the entire Armenian population in 2023. Georgia maintains good relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The region has also played a key role in economic and transportation networks between Asia and Europe. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline brings Caspian oil to Europe, and the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipeline does the same for natural gas. Georgia, a transit country for both projects, is slated to build a new port at Anaklia, which could help the country become a trading hub between Europe and Asia.  Following the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia adopted a democratic and pro-Western orientation. However, over the past five to six years, Georgia has been expanding relations with Russia and, more recently, has adopted a range of policies that indicate a shift away from a Western trajectory toward closer ties with Russia and China. Increased trade with Russia and selecting a Chinese-Singaporean consortium to build the Anaklia port are examples of this. All this while Georgia finally was granted EU candidate status in December 2023, which was later halted as a result of the laws passed by the Georgian government. This fall promises no abatement of the region’s political, economic, and military activity. Georgia’s Euro–Atlantic aspirations are at stake; Armenia is pursuing a policy of diversification and closer ties with the West, while Azerbaijan is strengthening its partnership with Turkey and mending differences with Russia. Amid these developments, Georgian voters will go to the polls on October 26 in elections that both the government and the opposition see as having vital consequences. The results of these elections and Georgia’s foreign policy orientation will play an important role in shaping the region’s future. On November 5, American voters will elect a new president. These elections will also affect the geopolitical future of the South Caucasus, determining the level of US engagement in the region and the behavior of South Caucasus states and neighboring powers. Georgian Elections The upcoming Georgian elections are less predictable than any in recent memory. The ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party has been steadily losing popularity and is now polling at 34.4%. Meanwhile, the opposition remains fractured, with no single party gaining more votes than GD. As a result, GD is likely to use all the resources at its disposal to win. Unless the opposition forms a single bloc, GD may remain the most powerful party in the parliament, even if it fails to secure a majority of seats. Scenario 1: Victory of Georgian Dream If GD wins outright and gains a majority of seats in the parliament, the victory will likely be met with mass protests similar to those that occurred this spring in response to the adoption of the “foreign agents law.” External reactions will be critical at this point. Should GD return to power, the Georgian government will continue what it considers to be “balanced diversification,” further improving relations with Russia and China while attempting to balance the two with the EU and the US. Formal diplomatic relations with Russia are unlikely to be reestablished due to the Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the fact that most Georgians support joining the European Union (86%) and NATO (79%). While a sharp U-turn toward Russia is not realistic in the short term, Georgia will likely increase its economic cooperation with Moscow, seeking to capitalize on re-export opportunities, and the latter will look for ways to expand its economic presence. Meanwhile, China’s involvement in Georgia’s infrastructure—particularly in constructing the Anaklia seaport—will continue. This will further shift Georgia toward China and help China establish itself as a new actor in the Black Sea, heightening competition among major regional powers. Relations with the West will continue to deteriorate, depending on the post-election situation and how severe a response Western powers adopt vis-à-vis Tbilisi. The EU and the US may not recognize the results if the elections are considered to have been rigged and are followed by large-scale protests. The EU may formally withdraw Georgia’s candidate status, impose sanctions, and cut financial aid, while NATO may formally rescind its membership pledge to Georgia. This scenario will likely draw Georgia closer to Turkey and Azerbaijan, which may align more closely with Russia. Such developments would limit the US and the EU’s capacity to influence the South Caucasus. If the West cuts ties with Georgia, Armenia may become the focus of US and EU attention as the only Western-leaning country in the region. On the one hand, this could result in increased economic and political support from the West for Armenia; on the

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From Armenia to the EU: Stay Strong on the South Caucasus

Geopolitics and Foreign Policy /

The events of the year 2022 led the European Union to build up its foreign and security policy efforts. Its unprecedented actions in the South Caucasus since then include: While the EU’s intention of being a constructive neighbor and a foreign policy powerhouse in the region is commendable, regional events have stress-tested its strength, signaling the limits of its engagement.  A growing number of commentators—including the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), the European Policy Centre (EPC), and the Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP)—have deplored the patchy and reactive nature of the EU’s approach. APRI Armenia called it “a lack of strategic vision.” The absence of a cohesive approach to the region undermines the EU’s policy objectives of being recognized as a “geopolitical weight and influence on the global stage,” as set out in Ursula von der Leyen’s political guidelines for the 2024–2029 European Commission.   With new policy leadership across the three EU institutions, now is an opportune time to reassess the effectiveness of the EU’s regional foreign policy objectives. The omission of the South Caucasus (and of its neighbors, except for Russia in the context of the Ukraine war) from the political guidelines for the new European Commission has been noted. We believe this omission is a mistake for several reasons.  The 2024–2029 European Commission must–for the sake of the EU’s stability, global standing, and the power it seeks to project to its citizens and the world— continue its engagement in the South Caucasus. Although not mentioned in the new Commission’s political guidelines, the fact that the three South Caucasus countries remain part of the European Commission Directorate-General for Enlargement, including the Neighbourhood portfolio, attests to the region’s strategic importance for the EU. The question is how EU leadership can strengthen its regional policy.  Recommendations: ■ Shape the EU’s strategic vision for the South Caucasus: To help formulate its strategic vision, the EU should further initiate and engage in Track 1.5 dialogues. This will help it better understand the South Caucasus region and its potential. The EU should focus on the region’s geo-economic advantages and the untapped potential for values-based trade connectivity. It should also support institutional capacity-building to help these countries make their policy institutions more effective.  ■ Strengthen its diplomacy with actions: EU officials’ statements must be followed by concrete actions. The Georgian government’s behavior this past year was largely met with soft responses from the EU, with a shift  occurring only recently. The statement by the High Representative on developments in Nagorno-Karabakh, made while Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh were under siege—“The EU stands ready to take appropriate actions in the event of a further deterioration of the situation”— was not followed through. The South Caucasus and regional powers remember these missed opportunities for the EU to assert its influence. The EU must use its leverage, not just rhetoric, to pressure Azerbaijan into signing a comprehensive peace agreement to deliver durable peace to the region.  ■ Engage with Turkey on the South Caucasus: Opening the Armenia–Turkey border would bring stability to the region and increase Armenia’s flexibility in its foreign and economic policies. Turkey has rejected normalization with Armenia, making it conditional on the signing of an Armenia–Azerbaijan agreement, which has become a moving target. The EU should be more assertive in urging Turkey to open the border with Armenia, as this would unlock benefits to the region.    ■ Reevaluate the Eastern Partnership: The EU should approach reforms in a more dynamic way to ensure that its policies remain relevant. As we have argued before, a profound overhaul of the Eastern Partnership could be instrumental in shaping the much-needed strategic vision of the EU’s place in the South Caucasus. The EU could consider creating a South Caucasus Partnership. In this new Partnership, investments in regional infrastructure projects that support connectivity and political peace could play a central role. ■ Always include all three countries in regional economic projects: The exclusion of Armenia when the Black Sea Submarine Cable Project was signed in December 2022 between Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary, in the presence of the European Commission’s president, was unjustified. The EU did shift its position in October 2023 by stating its support for Armenia’s participation in the project. However, such exclusion, even tacitly, should not have been acceptable in the first place, especially since the EU is built on the philosophy that intra-regional economic projects help foster peace. This commitment to economic inclusivity should extend to all ongoing trade connectivity considerations.  ■ Create values-based economic relations with third countries: The EU should integrate a human rights due diligence process into its trade relationships with non-EU countries, similar to the expectations it places on its companies under the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. This approach will most effectively link the EU’s values-based foreign policy with its trade policy.   We believe that the EU, with its constructive philosophy and geographical proximity that help it navigate geopolitical complexities, can be a force for good in the South Caucasus. This would benefit EU citizens and the people of the South Caucasus and strengthen the EU’s standing in an unstable global order.

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Armenia’s European Aspirations: Navigating Geopolitical Challenges and Economic Dependencies

Armenia’s European Aspirations: Navigating Geopolitical Challenges and Economic Dependencies

Geopolitics and Foreign Policy /

The article was originally published as part of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) The recent statement of the Armenian Foreign Minister in the margins of the Antalya Diplomatic Forum denotes Armenia’s desire to join the European Union. This aspiration raises important questions on Armenia’s current position and options, which this article seeks to shed light on. At the same time, today’s complicated geopolitical environment highlights the need for the EU to formulate a strategic vision for the region.   Between Pax Europa and Pax Russica, Armenia first went with the latter. However, following Yerevan’s defeat in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the military takeover of the region by Azerbaijan, despite the presence of the Russian peacekeepers, Armenia has now opted for the former. It stated its desire, backed by the EU, to join the Black Sea energy cable project (from which it has been excluded, reportedly as a result of pressures from Azerbaijan) and promote a regional infrastructure and connectivity project called the Crossroad of Peace, embracing, as European leaders did after World War II, the peace-building effects of economic regional integration projects.   A staircase approach for effective delivery  The question of European integration includes two further issues, one on “Rusxit” and another on policy approximation. Today, Armenia has frozen its Collective Security Treaty Organisation membership and appears to be going in this direction with regards to the Commonwealth of Independent States, but it firmly remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). If on the one hand, Armenia is detaching itself from Moscow militarily and diplomatically, on the other, it remains economically engaged with Russia and the EAEU, a point Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan reaffirmed after meeting Russian President Putin in May 2024. In fact, Moscow is Yerevan’s largest trading partner and main energy supplier.   Economic diplomacy, including trade, is arguably the greatest divide between the EU and Armenia, however it is also an area with great potential for improvement Back in 2013, when Armenia and the EU were negotiating an association agreement – at the same time as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova – Armenia withdrew from the negotiations, announcing that it would be joining the EAEU. In 2017, the EU and Armenia signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Although covering many aspects, CEPA excludes free trade given Armenia’s membership in the EAEU. In the current context, a staircase approach to bringing Armenia closer to EU market standards and gradually decreasing its dependence on Russian trade is necessary. Greater support from and cooperation with the EU in building stronger sanitary and market standards for Armenian products would be a great (and achievable) first step.   The second element preconditioning Armenia’s European aspiration is policy approximation. Here, the baseline would be to fully implement the CEPA, as even three years after the agreement entered into force, Armenia still lags behind. A great deal of work is needed to implement its civic reforms section in particular. This entails upgrading institutional capacity-building in public administration. The EU and Member States can better tailor and institutionalise their support, building on their expertise in evidence-based policy analysis and intergovernmental communications and processes. This would not only reinforce diplomatic dialogue, but also help strengthen policymaking for Armenian citizens.   A diversified foreign policy   Some argue that Armenia is strategically adopting an ambiguous position, paving the way for an alternative pursuit of diversification. In truth, the Armenian approach has been to gradually detach itself from Russian dependency and intensify its diplomatic engagements – not just with the EU but also with the Global South, including India, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Armenia is also working on what it can offer. This includes the Crossroad of Peace, as well as its potential as a tech powerhouse.   Armenia is closely watching the ongoing events in Georgia, as its own European trajectory also depends on Tbilisi. Many powers from inside and outside the region are following how the EU engages the South Caucasus, particularly after 2021, when European Council President Michel became the facilitator of the now-defunct Brussels platform of peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.   The EU’s contradictions  The EU has shown several times its political investment in making the region peaceful and more prosperous. It established an energy agreement with Azerbaijan. It agreed to establish a civilian mission to observe the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, following Azerbaijan’s aggression and land-grab of Armenian territories in September 2022 — all this while Azerbaijan continues to refuse and denigrate the EU Mission to Armenia; it affirmed its desire to strengthen and deepen EU–Armenia relations following the military assault of Azerbaijan on the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing them to leave the enclave in September 2023; lastly, it granted Georgia candidate status in December 2023.   Significantly, Azerbaijan’s repeated assaults triggered the EU to actively pursue greater closeness with Armenia. This has put the EU in an awkward position, given Azerbaijan’s refusal to continue to engage in the Brussels format despite the otherwise celebrated strategic energy partnership with the two and Georgia’s decision and persistence in adopting the Foreign Influence Law despite holding EU candidate status. The EU’s contradictions and reaction to regional events, which are misaligned with its policy priorities, signal its lack of strategic vision and the limited effectiveness of its foreign policy in the region. Using the EU’s ambiguities, we observe a rapprochement between Russia and Azerbaijan, reinforced by their drive to obstruct the West’s increased presence while keeping the safe distance of an economic partnership that only renders the bloc dependent on them.  As the EU elections pave the way for a new legislative cycle, an important question looms on Brussels: how will its lack of strategic vision and action uphold its long-term interests and foundational priorities?

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