Updated on June 17, 2025
What Happened
On June 13, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the launch of “Operation Rising Lion,” which he described as a “preventive strike on nuclear and military infrastructure.” Bombing raids targeted military leaders and top nuclear scientists, as well as nuclear, military, and later energy facilities. In response, Iran launched “Operation True Promise-3,” with strikes aimed at military targets, energy infrastructure, and decision-making centers. Both Israel and Iran also struck civilian infrastructure. As of publication, Israel continues to carry out regular strikes on Iran, having gained relative freedom of movement in Iranian airspace. Tehran’s responses remain more limited in terms of timing and the means employed. The hostilities began two days before the United States and Iran were to have held their sixth meeting on a potential nuclear deal.
The Iran–Israel confrontation is already affecting Armenia’s economy and military security. With no signs of de-escalation, the continuation of the conflict may worsen Armenia’s existing problems and create new challenges for the country. This APRI Armenia Analysis examines the consequences of this escalation for Armenia and formulates recommendations to support regional stability.
Key Lessons
- The rules-based international order continues to erode, with the “normalization” of the use of force as a tool for resolving disputes between states.
- Trust in negotiation processes has faltered. For months, the United States and Iran had been engaged in negotiations over the nuclear dossier. The sixth round of talks was scheduled to take place in Oman on June 15, and has been cancelled due to the conflict. President Donald Trump said that the United States had been informed in advance of Israel’s plans to attack Iran, other countries may have been informed, too. This raises longer-term questions as to how genuine negotiations have been between Iran and the US, with possible lessons for other negotiations as well.
- Conventional restraints on military targets have been weakened. Strikes against nuclear facilities, military leadership, and the scientists of a foreign state signal the emergence of a new practice in selecting targets, one that other states may now feel more emboldened to adopt.
- Polarization among powers is deepening. The G7, made up of the US, Canada, Japan, and leading European countries—France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy—have declared their support for Israel’s “security [and] right to defend itself.” Meanwhile, China, Turkey, Russia, and other countries, including Armenia, have condemned Israel’s attacks.
Consequences for Armenia
1. Security
After the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Iran played a leading role in maintaining stability in the South Caucasus. Its firm statements against any change in the internationally recognized borders of the region served as a key brake on the realization of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” and “Western Azerbaijan” agendas promoted by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Iran allegedly stopped Azerbaijan’s further invasion of Armenia in September 2022. Baku and Ankara may perceive the weakening of Iran’s military capabilities as a window of opportunity to increase military pressure on Armenia. Coincidentally, on June 14, Hikmet Hajiyev, Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan, stated that Baku expects concrete actions from Armenia regarding the opening of the “Zangezur Corridor,” which “holds strategic importance for the entire region,” underlining the strength of their desire for a direct route connecting Turkic nations.
The weakening of Iran’s political leadership may trigger separatist movements in the northern parts of Iran to create the “Autonomous Southern Azerbaijan Republic,” which would benefit Azerbaijan, Israel, and other countries that desire the decline of Iran’s power.
If the conflict continues, Armenia might face an influx of tens or even hundreds of thousands of refugees from northern Iran. Ethnic Armenians of Iranian nationality and the diplomatic community might also evacuate via Armenia. Iranians wishing to flee their country are likely to choose between Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, as these have the most convenient land borders. Given that northern Iran is populated by Azeri-speaking Iranians, one cannot exclude the possibility of their fleeing to Armenia. If this were to occur, it would put pressure on the socioeconomic fabric of Armenia and could reinforce its geopolitical risks.
Finally, should hostilities persist, Armenia will face problems receiving Indian weapons, which are delivered through Iranian airspace or its territory.
2. Economy
More than 30% of Armenia’s trade passes through Iran, according to public figures. On June 16, Armenian Minister of Economy Gevorg Papoyan stated that there were Armenian goods at the Iranian Bandar Abbas port that had not yet exited it and that other goods were still in transit. If delays built up, Armenia might face shortages of some goods, while companies risked failing to meet contracts, resulting in financial penalties and market losses.
3. Environment
One of the key targets of the Israeli strikes has been Iran’s nuclear facilities. The largest of these installations—Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant—is located approximately 800 kilometers from Armenia’s border. The International Atomic Energy Agency reported radiological and chemical contamination at one of the uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz. A similar situation could potentially happen at other sites even closer to Armenia’s border, posing serious environmental and public health risks for the region.
Recommendations
- The Armenian government should launch consultations with security partners using existing mechanisms under the coordination of the Armenian Security Council. The objectives of these consultations would be to highlight the increased risks of renewed escalation by Azerbaijan and reaffirm that Armenia will take all necessary measures to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and call on its security partners to be ready to take necessary measures to reduce possible regional instability.
- Establish a governmental task force under the supervision of one of the deputy prime ministers to explore options for mitigating the negative economic impact caused by difficulties in export/import operations via Iran. These might include greater use of the transit potential of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea to access Middle Eastern and Asian markets.
- Launch consultations with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office in Yerevan and other relevant international organizations to coordinate emergency plans in case of an influx of refugees into the southern regions of Armenia from Iran. As part of managing any significant flow of refugees at the Armenia–Iran border, the Armenian authorities could launch consultations with the leadership of Russian border troops deployed in Armenia.
- Prepare and communicate evacuation programs for Armenian citizens and ethnic Armenians from Iran and Israel, should they wish to leave.
The analysis is also available in Armenian.
