The article was originally published as part of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies’ (ISPI) dossier “20 years after the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement”. Benyamin Poghosyan, ISPI Senior Associate Research Fellow and APRI Armenia Senior Research Fellow is a co-author of this article. 

The recent statement of the Armenian Foreign Minister in the margins of the Antalya Diplomatic Forum denotes Armenia’s desire to join the European Union. This aspiration raises important questions on Armenia’s current position and options, which this article seeks to shed light on. At the same time, today’s complicated geopolitical environment highlights the need for the EU to formulate a strategic vision for the region.  

Between Pax Europa and Pax Russica, Armenia first went with the latter. However, following Yerevan’s defeat in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the military takeover of the region by Azerbaijan, despite the presence of the Russian peacekeepers, Armenia has now opted for the former. It stated its desire, backed by the EU, to join the Black Sea energy cable project (from which it has been excluded, reportedly as a result of pressures from Azerbaijan) and promote a regional infrastructure and connectivity project called the Crossroad of Peace, embracing, as European leaders did after World War II, the peace-building effects of economic regional integration projects.  

A staircase approach for effective delivery 

The question of European integration includes two further issues, one on “Rusxit” and another on policy approximation. Today, Armenia has frozen its Collective Security Treaty Organisation membership and appears to be going in this direction with regards to the Commonwealth of Independent States, but it firmly remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). If on the one hand, Armenia is detaching itself from Moscow militarily and diplomatically, on the other, it remains economically engaged with Russia and the EAEU, a point Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan reaffirmed after meeting Russian President Putin in May 2024. In fact, Moscow is Yerevan’s largest trading partner and main energy supplier.  

Economic diplomacy, including trade, is arguably the greatest divide between the EU and Armenia, however it is also an area with great potential for improvement Back in 2013, when Armenia and the EU were negotiating an association agreement – at the same time as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova – Armenia withdrew from the negotiations, announcing that it would be joining the EAEU. In 2017, the EU and Armenia signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Although covering many aspects, CEPA excludes free trade given Armenia’s membership in the EAEU. In the current context, a staircase approach to bringing Armenia closer to EU market standards and gradually decreasing its dependence on Russian trade is necessary. Greater support from and cooperation with the EU in building stronger sanitary and market standards for Armenian products would be a great (and achievable) first step.  

The second element preconditioning Armenia’s European aspiration is policy approximation. Here, the baseline would be to fully implement the CEPA, as even three years after the agreement entered into force, Armenia still lags behind. A great deal of work is needed to implement its civic reforms section in particular. This entails upgrading institutional capacity-building in public administration. The EU and Member States can better tailor and institutionalise their support, building on their expertise in evidence-based policy analysis and intergovernmental communications and processes. This would not only reinforce diplomatic dialogue, but also help strengthen policymaking for Armenian citizens.  

A diversified foreign policy  

Some argue that Armenia is strategically adopting an ambiguous position, paving the way for an alternative pursuit of diversification. In truth, the Armenian approach has been to gradually detach itself from Russian dependency and intensify its diplomatic engagements – not just with the EU but also with the Global South, including India, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Armenia is also working on what it can offer. This includes the Crossroad of Peace, as well as its potential as a tech powerhouse.  

Armenia is closely watching the ongoing events in Georgia, as its own European trajectory also depends on Tbilisi. Many powers from inside and outside the region are following how the EU engages the South Caucasus, particularly after 2021, when European Council President Michel became the facilitator of the now-defunct Brussels platform of peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  

The EU’s contradictions 

The EU has shown several times its political investment in making the region peaceful and more prosperous. It established an energy agreement with Azerbaijan. It agreed to establish a civilian mission to observe the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, following Azerbaijan’s aggression and land-grab of Armenian territories in September 2022 — all this while Azerbaijan continues to refuse and denigrate the EU Mission to Armenia; it affirmed its desire to strengthen and deepen EU–Armenia relations following the military assault of Azerbaijan on the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing them to leave the enclave in September 2023; lastly, it granted Georgia candidate status in December 2023.  

Significantly, Azerbaijan’s repeated assaults triggered the EU to actively pursue greater closeness with Armenia. This has put the EU in an awkward position, given Azerbaijan’s refusal to continue to engage in the Brussels format despite the otherwise celebrated strategic energy partnership with the two and Georgia’s decision and persistence in adopting the Foreign Influence Law despite holding EU candidate status. The EU’s contradictions and reaction to regional events, which are misaligned with its policy priorities, signal its lack of strategic vision and the limited effectiveness of its foreign policy in the region. Using the EU’s ambiguities, we observe a rapprochement between Russia and Azerbaijan, reinforced by their drive to obstruct the West’s increased presence while keeping the safe distance of an economic partnership that only renders the bloc dependent on them. 

As the EU elections pave the way for a new legislative cycle, an important question looms on Brussels: how will its lack of strategic vision and action uphold its long-term interests and foundational priorities?