In the late months of 2022 and 2023 there were intensive discussions about the possible signature of the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement. Both international mediators and facilitators, as well as representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan were making statements that a peace agreement signature is within reach. As we enter 2024, discussions are underway about the potential signature of the Armenia – Azerbaijan agreement in 2024. The December 7, 2023, bilateral statement on the release of Prisoners of War and Armenia’s support of the Azerbaijani bid to host the COP29 in Baku gave more impetus to these hopes. Some believe that the military takeover of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 made this perspective more realistic, especially as the Armenian government agreed not to include anything on Nagorno Karabakh in the peace agreement.

However, as with any agreement, the content is more important than the title, and here, Armenia and Azerbaijan have different approaches.

Azerbaijan argues that sides should sign a framework document that will include only general terms and will omit any issues upon which sides cannot reach a consensus. Thus, the peace agreement should not have any clarity about the principles of delimitation and demarcation, one of the key areas of the negotiations, and any agreement on what map should be used as a base for the process. The document should not also include any agreed principles on the restoration of communications, another key issue, especially on the issues of passport and border control.

According to Azerbaijan’s point of view, these issues should be discussed in future negotiations, while the agreement itself will include some general statements on the recognition of territorial integrity, noninterference, and not using each other’s territory for any harmful activities against the sides. Azerbaijan argues that the signature of the framework agreement will significantly decrease the tensions, diminish the likelihood of the resumption of hostilities, and will pave the way for more constructive negotiations to find solutions over the thorniest issues. It also argues that a contrario the absence of any peace agreement will increase the likelihood of military flare-ups and will keep the situation volatile, thus hinting that if Armenia rejects the signature of the framework agreement, then Azerbaijan “is justified in using military mean as  it did in May and November 2021 and September 2022 to achieve its political aims.

Simultaneously, Azerbaijan continues to demand a de facto extraterritorial corridor via Armenia to connect Azerbaijan with the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic. This position was once more emphasized by President Aliyev during his January 10, 2024, interview with local media. President Aliyev mentioned that no border, passport, or customs control should take place for goods that will pass via Armenia from Azerbaijan to Nakhijevan; otherwise, Azerbaijan will not open any communication with Armenia, and “Armenia will continue to be a dead end.” In the same interview, President Aliyev told that Azerbaijan will not agree to have any guarantors for the future peace agreement.

Interestingly, while Azerbaijan argues that there should be no controls to connect one part of Azerbaijan with another, Baku has never claimed to have passport, border, and customs control-free transit via Iran to reach Nakhijevan from Azerbaijan proper. Azerbaijan has used Iranian territory for the last 30 years to connect with Nakhijevan and recently came to agreement with Iran to establish new routes via Iran to reach Nakhijevan, but there was no talk about Iran granting passport, border, and customs-free regime for Azerbaijani persons and cargo traveling via Iranian territory to reach Nakhijevan. 

Armenia, on the other hand, categorically rejects the possibility of allowing the passage of goods via its territory without any passport, border, or customs control and insists on the necessity of establishing guarantors, as well as an international dispute-solving mechanism to prevent and manage any future breach of the agreement. Armenia believes that any peace agreement should at least include the principles of the future border delimitation and demarcation process with agreed maps, as well as clarity over the process of restoration of communications. Armenia argues that a peace agreement should not leave any space for misinterpretations, which is likely to trigger future tensions and escalations. Thus, from the Armenian perspective, if all problematic issues are simply taken out from the text of the agreement, the document itself will become an empty shell which will not solve any problems and will not decrease the possibility of new military escalations.

Azerbaijan sent its latest version of suggestions on a peace agreement to Armenia in late December 2023, and Armenia shared its version with Baku on January 4, 2024. The Armenian Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Security Council recently mentioned that Armenia saw some regression in the latest Azerbaijani suggestions shared with Armenia. They did not disclose any details, but it is probably related to Azerbaijani’s demands for control-free movement via Armenia from Azerbaijan to Nakhijevan and the rejection of the institute of guarantors.    

How should Armenia and Azerbaijan move forward towards the signature of the peace agreement? If they agree on the Azerbaijani vision, then the peace agreement will simply fix the new post-September 2023 status quo, where there is no self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic, no Armenians living there, with Armenia accepting this reality with no vision and no wish to change it, and with at least 200 square km of Armenian territory remaining under Azerbaijani control. Simultaneously, essential disagreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan on all other issues will remain in place; there will be no restoration of communication, no start of border delimitation and demarcation process, and threats will always be there for new Azerbaijani attacks. Thus, the “framework agreement” will only serve Azerbaijani interests to close the Nagorno Karabakh chapter while providing no benefits and real assurance of future security to Armenia. Some may argue that any framework agreement is better than no agreement at all, mentioning that the lack of agreement paves the way for new attacks against Armenia by Azerbaijan. However, as we mentioned, the “framework agreement” will not reduce, but only delay, the threat of new Azerbaijani attacks, as Baku may well continue its policy of blackmailing Armenia with new aggression, as far as Armenia is not giving concessions on the corridor, guarantors, delimitation and other issues.

Thus, the signature of the framework agreement now, under the imposed conditions, does not serve Armenia’s national interests; it may legitimize the military takeover of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan and forced displacement of Armenians while keeping the door for further Azerbaijani attacks against Armenia.

Armenia should refuse the signature of framework agreement, instead calling for a comprehensive document, which will fix the principles of border delimitation and demarcation, and restoration of communications. Simultaneously, Armenia should increase efforts to share its message with international partners, that framework agreement will not bring stability and security to the region, and instead will open the way for future military escalations. Armenia also should emphasize that the absence of peace agreement cannot serve for Azerbaijan as a justification for new military attacks against Armenia and should call all actors involved in the region to send that message to Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, multiple war crimes against Armenians, coupled with strong anti-Armenian hate propaganda, which is, unfortunately, still widespread in Azerbaijan, are clear indications that Armenian passengers and cargo will not be able to pass through Azerbaijan to reach Iran, Russia, or other parts of Armenia without special security guarantees. Azerbaijan, given its recent behavior and ongoing rhetoric against Armenians, cannot provide realistic guarantees to Armenian cargo and passengers. The involvement of a third country or international organization is the only way to stabilize the situation and pave the way for the restoration of communications. Armenian government should raise this issue during negotiations with Azerbaijan, and its contacts with international partners.